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CASENOTES
JUDGMENTS-Prior to Entry of Judgment Pursuant to a
Cognovit Note, a Hearing Is Required to Determine the
Validity of the Debtor's Waiver of Due Process Rights.
Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 597 (1978).
A cognovit note, or confession of judgment, is a contract in which one
party authorizes another party to enter judgment against him in any dis-
pute that might arise in the course of performance of the contract.I
Cognovits are typically used to secure debts by giving a creditor maximum
protection against a debtor's default. By using a cognovit note, the author-
izing party forfeits his right to notice and a hearing before judgment is
entered.2 Although the practice is greatly restricted in most states,3 one
1. A typical cognovit clause reads:
The undersigned and each of them hereby authorize any attorney at law to appear
in any Court of Record in the State ... or in the United States, after this note
becomes due under any of its conditions and waive the issuance and service of
process and confess a judgment against the undersigned or any of them in favor of
the legal holder hereof for the amount then appearing due hereon, together with
actual court costs upon the entry of judgment, and thereupon to release all error
and waive all right of appeal.
Hopson, Cognovit Judgments."An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit,
29 U. Cm. L. REV. 111, 111 n.2 (1961).
2. See Note, Cognovit Revisited- Due Process and Confession of Judgment, 24 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1045, 1046 (1973).
3. Restrictions on the use of cognovit notes vary from state to state. Only one state
completely outlaws them. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-16 (1953) and § 50-16-5 (Supp.
1975). A majority of the states permit sophisticated commercial creditors to use cognovit
notes while outlawing them in consumer credit transactions. See ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 18-16
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-629 (1956), § 44-143 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-
415, 5-3-407 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-88 (West 1958); D.C. Code § 28-
3804 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.05, 516.16 (1969); IDAHO CODE §§ 28:32-415,
28:33-407 (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3306 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 16a-3-306 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 288.580, 372.140 (Baldwin 1970); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 3.306 (West Supp. 1978); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-311 (1975
& Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255B, § 20 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 493.12,445.864 (West 1967 & Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.12 (West
1970 & Supp. 1977), 168.71 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 13-811
(1947), 47-213 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-447, 8-823 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 675.350
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commentator recently noted that cognovit notes are "alive and well" and
have survived attacks under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 4 In Isbell v. County of Sonoma,5 however, the California
Supreme Court struck down state statutes authorizing the use of cognovit
notes in non-consumer agreements. The statutes were found to lack ade-
quate constitutional protections because debtors were deprived of notice
and a hearing before judgment was entered. The decision raises questions
about the constitutionality of cognovit notes in other jurisdictions, particu-
larly those in which commercial lenders are likely to use them. 6
The plaintiffs, Eva Isbell and Clevie and Omega Pearson, were welfare
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:5 (1968), §361-A:7 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:16C-37 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 353, 570 (McKinney 1971);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-18 (Supp. 1977), § 53-181 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-03-15
(1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-415
(1972); OR. REV. STAT. § 725.050 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-25-24 (1968); S.C. CODE
§ 34-29-170 (1976); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 5069, §§ 3.20 (Vernon 1971), 6.05 (Vernon
1971 & Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-415, 70B-3-407 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2456 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 31.08.150 (1961 & Supp. 1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 422.405 (West 1974); WYo. STAT. §§ 40-14-249, 40-14-338 (1977).
States which do not make the distinction between commercial and consumer users regu-
late the use of cognovit notes in a variety of ways. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1973) and
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-301 (1962) (personal appearance of debtor required); GA. CODE
ANN. § 110-601 (1973) (suit must be regularly filed and docketed); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-
34 (Supp. 1974) (cognovits prohibited only in residential rental agreements); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-2-26-1, 34-1-28-3 (Burns 1973) (personal appearance of debtor or affidavit re-
quired; penalty if procedure not followed); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-181 (1972) (statement
under oath to follow prescribed form); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511:070 to 511:080 (Vernon 1949)
(verification by affidavit required); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-201 (1955) (action must be insti-
tuted and service of process required); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-431 to 8.01-441 (1977) (judgment
debtor may move to set aside within 21 days following notice of judgment entered against
him; specific form to be followed); W. VA. CODE § 56-4-48 (1966) (if judgment entered by
clerk, court reserves right to vacate).
Only five states are generally permissive in allowing cognovit notes as a means of debt
security. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3908 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (Smith-Hurd
1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3585, 10:3-112 (West Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 739 (Purdon 1953 & Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-26-1 to 21-26-7
(1967).
The Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly outlaw cognovit notes with regard to
the sale of goods, but requires consideration of the "commercial needs of the particular trade
or case" in determining if a clause is unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment I (1972
version). The guiding principle is the "prevention of oppression and unfair surprise." Id.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code prohibits the use of cognovit notes in claims arising
out of a consumer credit sale or consumer lease. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 2.415 (1969).
4. See Note, supra note 2, at 1064-65. See also Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. Supp.
1392 (D. Nev. 1973); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 IlL. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542
(1975); Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974).
5. 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978), cerl. denied, 99 S. Ct. 597
(1978).
6. See note 3 supra.
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recipients in Sonoma County. In 1967, when Isbell pleaded guilty to wel-
fare fraud, the court did not order restitution.7 While serving thirty days in
jail, however, Isbell was induced by a county representative to sign a cog-
novit note for $596.98 in alleged agency overpayments plus an undeter-
mined amount for medical payments.8 The document was filed with the
clerk of the municipal court and a judgment entered. When Isbell
purchased a house seven years later, that judgment became a lien on her
property. In 1966, judgment was also entered against Clevie and Omega
Pearson who had signed a similar cognovit for alleged agency overpay-
ments in the amount of $193.00. 9 Neither Isbell nor the Pearsons were
represented by counsel and each had only a layman's understanding of the
law. After judgment had been entered, the plaintiffs submitted their cause
on stipulated facts and claimed that the California laws governing cogno-
vit notes were unconstitutional.' 0 The Superior Court for the County of
Sonoma upheld the judgments" and the California Court of Appeals
7. 21 Cal. 3d at 65, 577 P.2d at 190, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
8. The county form read:
I hereby confess judgment in favor of the County of Sonoma, the plaintiff above
named, for the sum of $ , and authorize entry of judgment
thereof against me. This judgment applies to any personal and real property I now
own or may acquire. This confession of judgment is for a debt justly due from me
to the said County of Sonoma, and arises upon the following facts: to
wit
Id. at 65 n.2, 577 P.2d at 190 n.2, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370 n.2.
9. Unlike Isbell, the Pearsons did not go to trial, but they confessed to acts of fraud in
the text of the cognovit note itself. Id.
10. The California statutes governing cognovit notes provide that a "confession ofjudg-
ment may be entered without action for money due or to become due or to secure any
person against contingent liability on behalf of the defendant, or both, in the manner pre-
scribed . . . . Such judgment may be entered in any court having jurisdiction for like
amounts." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1132(a) (West 1972). In 1975, subdivision (b) was ad-
ded to this section to protect consumer-debtors by requiring that an attorney independently
representing the consumer certify that his client understands that he is waiving his due proc-
ess rights and that the attorney recommends that the cognovit procedure be used. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1132 (b) as amended, 1975 Cal. Stats., Ch. 304, p. 807, § 1. The confession
must be in writing, signed and verified, and "state concisely the facts constituting the liabil-
ity." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1133 (West 1972).
Furthermore, California has enacted a number of statutes to restrict the use of cognovit
notes in certain kinds of retail-consumer transactions. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 24468
(West 1968) (licensees under California small loan law); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.7 (West
1974) (automobile conditional sales contracts). Since the plaintiffs in this case were not con-
sumers, they were not protected by these recent enactments. 21 Cal. 3d at 67, 577 P.2d at
191, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 371. For a discussion of recent developments in California law as it
pertains to cognovit notes, see Note, Confession of Judgment in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 99
(1977).
11. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, No. 75-78372 (Super. Ct., County of Sonoma, October
6, 1975).
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affirmed. 12
By a four-to-three vote, the California Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts. 13 Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, found the perti-
nent statutes governing these cognovit notes' 4 unconstitutional for three
reasons. First, the court concluded that, on its face, the signed confession
of judgment was insufficient to demonstrate that a debtor had voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to notice and a hearing.1 5
Second, the court noted that the statutes failed to provide a method for
determining the validity of a debtor's waiver of due process rights prior to
entry of judgment. 16 Finally, the court required some proof of a valid
waiver of constitutional rights, even if the debtor had an opportunity for
post-judgment relief.' 7  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson
claimed that, since the plaintiffs had notice of the dispute and an opportu-
nity to be heard, the state had satisfied the requirements of due process.' 8
A review of recent law dealing with the due process rights of debtors pro-
vides a framework for evaluating this decision.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PRESERVING
DEBTORS' RIGHTS
At common law, '9 cognovit notes satisfied the jurisdictional requirement
12. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 65 Cal. App. 3d 796, 135 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1977).
13. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 597 (1978).
14. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1132(b) was not affected by the decision since this case did
not involve a consumer transaction. 21 Cal. 3d at 74 n.7, 577 P.2d at 196 n.7, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 376 n.7. See note 10 supra. The decision of the court was given limited retroactive effect,
permitting previous judgments to stand, but allowing judgment debtors to apply for hearings
to determine the validity of waiver. Creditors would bear the burden of proof in meeting the
challenges of debtors. Id. at 75, 577 P.2d at 196, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
15. Id. at 68-71, 577 P.2d at 192-93, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
16. Id. at 71, 577 P.2d at 193-94, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
17. Under California law, a debtor may set aside a judgment by filing an application for
relief within six months and by proving fraud or mistake. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473
(West 1972 & Supp. 1978). See Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal. 2d 570, 575, 122 P.2d 564, 567
(1942).
18. 21 Cal. 3d at 76-81, 577 P.2d at 197-200, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377-80 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). Justices Clark and Manuel concurred in the dissent.
19. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397. At common law there were two types of
confession of judgment: cognovit actionem and warrant of attorney. A debtor would execute
a cognovit actionem after a creditor had brought suit. In order to avoid court costs and to
obtain the creditor's permission for a plan of repayment, the debtor confessed his indebted-
ness in writing and authorized the creditor to enter judgment against him in the event of a
subsequent default. A warrant of attorney, on the other hand, was entered into prior to
commencement of the action and was used by a creditor as a security device for a loan. The
instrument authorized the creditor to obtain judgment against the debtor upon default with-
[Vol. 28:377
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of notice in one of two ways: a defendant could consent to a court's juris-
diction or he could authorize an attorney to consent for him.20 The United
States Supreme Court has found such consent provisions constitutionally
adequate provided that the defendant receives actual notice of the pending
suit.2 1 Although the Court has permitted contractual waiver of due proc-
ess rights, it has never established standards governing the constitutional-
ity of such waivers.22 Since use of a cognovit note implies a waiver of due
process rights, the validity of a debtor's waiver is the crucial issue in deter-
mining the constitutionality of such a note.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of cognovit notes for
the first time in D. H Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. 23 The Overmyer Corpora-
tion had defaulted in its payments to the Frick Company. With assistance
of counsel, the corporations negotiated a new note which included a cog-
novit clause conforming to Ohio law. 24 Overmyer subsequently stopped
payment, claiming a breach of contract by Frick. Without giving prior
notice to Overmyer, Frick caused judgment to be entered on the note in
Ohio. In a post-judgment hearing, the Ohio court rejected Overmyer's
plea to vacate Frick's judgment. 25 Overmyer then filed a motion to stay
execution and a motion for a new trial, claiming that the company had
been deprived of service of process, voluntary appearance, and genuine
out giving notice or an opportunity to contest the action. The most important distinction
between the two kinds of confession of judgment is that in the cognovit actionem, the debtor
always received notice of the suit and an opportunity to be heard, whereas in the warrant of
attorney, these protections were not required. See Note, supra note 10, at 100-01.
For a discussion of the origin and development of confessions of judgment, see Note,
Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524, 525-28 (1954).
20. See Hopson, supra note 1, at 127.
21. Compare Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (implied consent statute giving state
court jurisdiction over non-resident motorists involved in accidents within the state valid if
motorist receives notice) with Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (similar statute invalid
because provision for notice is lacking). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action).
22. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (contract provid-
ing waiver of notice is constitutional provided agent designated to receive notice gives
prompt notification to defendants). Cf. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(statutory provision permitting pre-judgment garnishment of wages without notice and a
hearing is unconstitutional). See notes 57 & 80 infra.
23. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Only two previous Supreme Court cases had dealt with cogno-
vit notes. See National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904) (cognovit note not negoti-
able and, if assigned, confessed judgment provisions become inoperative); Grover & Baker
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890) (if note authorizes confession of judg-
ment by attorney, judgment entered by prothonotary invalid).
24. 405 U.S. at 180.
25. Id. at 181-82.
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representation by an attorney before judgment was entered.2 6
Emphasizing that cognovit notes "may well serve a proper and useful
purpose in the commercial world,"2 7 the Supreme Court unanimously up-
held the agreement, holding that cognovit notes were not per se unconsti-
tutional.2 8 The Court recognized that fourteenth amendment rights could
be waived provided the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.29
Consequently, Overmyer's due process rights were held to be protected
adequately under Ohio statutes according the debtor notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard immediately after entry of judgment.30 The Court cau-
tioned, however, that the nature of the bargaining situation could
determine the result. Thus, if a cognovit agreement were one of adhesion,
if the parties were unequal in bargaining power, or if there were no consid-
eration for the cognovit clause, the Overmyer Court indicated that such an
agreement would not be so readily upheld. 3'
The Court's concern about unconscionable cognovit agreements was re-
inforced in Overmyer's companion case, Swarb v. Lennox, 32 in which the
Court upheld a district court injunction preventing creditors in Penn-
sylvania from executing confessed judgments against a class of plaintiffs
earning less than $10,000 annually, without some showing of an "under-
standing waiver. ' 33 In Swarb, the plaintiffs had submitted as evidence a
study indicating that consumer cognovit debtors are often victims of over-
reaching creditors. 34 Departing from its characterization of corporate
debtors in Overmyer, the Court found that these consumer debtors had not
"intentionally, understandingly, and voluntarily" waived their due process
rights.35 After Swarb, it thus appeared more likely that a contractual
26. Id. at 182-84.
27. Id. at 188. The Court specifically found that the two corporations represented by
counsel had dealt at arm's length. There was no inequality of bargaining power and no
contract of adhesion. Additionally, sufficient consideration had been provided for the rene-
gotiated note. Id.
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id. at 185. These three requirements are arguably in the conjunctive since a waiver
can be knowing and intelligent, yet the result of coercion. See Note, supra note 2, at 1051.
30. 405 U.S. at 188 and 175 n.l. Post-judgment review was not discretionary. The trial
court was required to vacate a judgment if the debtor presented evidence sufficient to pre-
vent a directed verdict against him. Id. at 189-90 (Douglas, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 188.
32. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
33. 341 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 1049 (1970).
34. The study indicated that of the 96% of Philadelphia debtors who had confessed
judgment in 1968, only 30% had graduated from high school and only 14% knew that the
contracts they had signed contained cognovit clauses. 405 U.S. at 198.
35. Id. at 199. The Court limited its holding to those earning less than $10,000 a year
since the record was not sufficient to support a finding that all cognovit judgment debtors
were adequately represented in the class action. Id. at 198-99.
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waiver would be constitutionally adequate in a corporate commercial set-
ting than in a consumer transaction.
The Supreme Court shed further light on the validity of waiver in Fuen-
tes v. Shevin. 36 Consumer-plaintiffs in Pennsylvania and Florida had
signed conditional sales contracts giving the seller-defendants the right of
immediate repossession upon default of payment. Under controlling state
laws, 37 court clerks had issued writs of replevin on the creditors' bare as-
sertions that they needed the writs to protect their property interests. As a
result, the debtors were deprived of their property without receiving either
notice or a hearing. 38 The sellers relied heavily on Overmyer in attempting
to justify the replevin procedures and uphold the repossession clause. The
Court, however, found the facts in Fuentes a "far cry" from those in
Overmyer.39 In Fuentes, the repossession clause was embedded in fine
print, there was no bargaining over the contractual terms, and the parties
were not equal in bargaining power. Accordingly, the Court found that
because the repossession clause did not clearly indicate that the debtor was
surrendering his right to notice and a hearing, it could not on its face
amount to a valid waiver of due process rights.40 The Court held that pre-
judgment replevin statutes violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment when the debtor is not provided a hearing before his property
is taken.4'
Fuentes and Overmyer can be read together to invalidate the use of cog-
novit notes under certain circumstances. If a cognovit clause is embedded
in boiler plate in a form contract, if the wording of the clause suggests that
a layman would not understand its legal consequences, or if there is dis-
parity in bargaining power between the parties, the burden of proof should
fall on the creditor to show that the debtor knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his due process rights.42 Thus, if a contractual setting
suggests coercion of the debtor, there is little likelihood that the lender will
prevail in a suit on the contract. The cases conflict, however, on whether a
pre-judgment or a post-judgment procedure is appropriate to determine
the validity of a debtor's waiver. Fuentes adopted a strict rule requiring
prior notice and a hearing before deprivation of a property right, whereas
Overmyer found post-judgment relief adequate, provided that the debtor
36. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. AM. tit. 12, § 1821 (Purdon
1967).
38. 407 U.S. at 73-75.
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id. at 95-96.
41. Id. at 96.
42. See Note, supra note 2, at 1052-53.
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had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived due process rights.43
More recent decisions indicate that post-judgment relief may suffice to
protect a debtor's due process rights.
The strict requirement of Fuentes was modified in Mitchell v. W T
Grant Co.,44 a case involving a consumer who had defaulted on payments
for appliances purchased from a department store. The goods were seized
by the sheriff after the credit manager of the Grant Company obtained a
writ of sequestration from a local judge. Under Louisiana law, a seller-
creditor holding a vendor's lien could obtain this writ which permitted the
sheriff to deprive the debtor of the property until the court determined the
liabilities of the parties. The creditor could take possession of the goods
within ten days if the purchaser had not posted his own bond.45 The pur-
chaser did not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard but was entitled
to a hearing immediately after seizure. The creditor was required to file a
bond and an affidavit showing specific facts rather than conclusory allega-
tions to justify the seizure. Only a judge could issue the writ. In finding
the statute constitutional, the Court reasoned that when only property
rights were involved, judicial inquiry into the respective rights of the par-
ties could be postponed, provided the deprived party has an adequate op-
portunity for ultimate judicial determination of liability.46
The Court distinguished the Fuentes replevin procedure as little more
43. This issue was addressed by the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware in Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del.), vacated and remanded, 405
U.S. 971 (1971). Osmond, like Swarb, involved consumer debtors victimized by overreach-
ing creditors. The Osmond court held that a cognovit debtor must receive notice and a
hearing prior to entry of judgment. Id. at 1359. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the deci-
sion was remanded for reconsideration in light of Overmyer and Swarb. 405 U.S. 971 (1971).
On remand, the district court reaffirmed its decision. 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). Os-
mond's pre-judgment hearing requirement arguably conflicts with Overmyer since post-
judgment relief was deemed adequate in that case. Under the Osmond rationale, the
Overmyer judgment should have been vacated because no hearing was held before judg-
ment was entered. See notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text, infra. See also Note, supra
note 2, at 1060-64.
Until Isbell, only one court had agreed with Osmond's reasoning that a pre-judgment
hearing is required. See Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
1203 (D.V.I. 1973). Cf. Chittester v. LC-DC-F Employees of G. E. Fed. Credit Union, 384
F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. I11. 1972); North
Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Schultz, 250 Pa. Super. 530, 378 A.2d 1275 (1977) (validity
of waiver to be determined before execution of judgment). Contra, Tunheim v. Bowman,
366 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Nev. 1973); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 I11. App. 3d 225, 326
N.E.2d 542 (1975); Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974).
44. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
45. Id. at 606 n.7. The creditor could not sell the goods until judgment was rendered.
ld.
46. Id. at 611.
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than a rubber stamp of the court clerk's determination offering no substan-
tive protection to the debtor. Alternatively, in Mitchell, issuance of the
writ was exclusively a judicial function performed only after the creditor
had filed an affidavit alleging his claims. Additionally, the debtor was en-
titled to a hearing immediately after deprivation, and damages were
awarded for the wrongful issuance of the writ.47 As suggested by Justice
Powell, the requirement for a pre-judgment procedure in Fuentes had been
limited to its facts by Mitchell since the replevin statute did not sufficiently
safeguard the debtor.48
A year later, the Court once again addressed these issues in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 49 At question was the constitu-
tionality of a Georgia statute permitting a pre-judgment writ of garnish-
ment to issue upon filing of an affidavit.50 The Di-Chem Corporation had
filed suit with the required affidavit to recover money allegedly due for
goods sold to the North Georgia Finishing Corporation. 5' The defendant
moved to dissolve the garnishment of its bank account alleging that its due
process rights had been violated. The trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.52
In finding the Georgia garnishment statute unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Fuentes proposition that any taking of prop-
erty is a deprivation within the purview of the due process clause.53 Notice
and a "hearing of some sort" were required to prevent the possibility of
47. Id. at 615-18.
48. Id. at 623-24 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed that the replevin proce-
dures in Fuentes were "arbitrary and unreasonable," but he claimed that by requiring an
adversary hearing prior to deprivation without consideration of the nature of the govern-
mental function and the private interests affected, the decision had established guidelines
which were too broad and inflexible. 1d. In his dissent, Justice Stewart maintained that the
Court had overruled Fuentes without pointing to a change in "societal perceptions or basic
constitutional understandings" to justify its conclusion. Id. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Fuentes was decided by a four-to-three vote. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not partici-
pate in the decision since they were not members when the case was argued. Their votes,
added to those of the three dissenters in Fuentes, resulted in a five-to-four vote in Mitchell.
See id. at 635 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
50. The creditor was required to file a bond equal to double the amount claimed due
with a court clerk who could authorize attachment without a hearing. The defendant could
then dissolve the garnishment by filing a bond conditioned on payment of any judgment
subsequently entered against him. Id. at 602-03.
51. The affidavit simply stated that there was "reason to apprehend" the loss of all or
some of the amount alleged due. Id. at 604 n.2.
52. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 231 Ga. 260, 201 S.E.2d 321 (1973),
rev'd, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
53. 419 U.S. at 606. Even though the parties in Di-Chem were of equal bargaining
power, the Court refused to "distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the
Due Process Clause." Id. at 608 citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 89-90.
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mistaken deprivation. 54 The Court then compared the Georgia statute to
the sequestration statute in Mitchell and determined that the Georgia stat-
ute did not afford sufficient protection. The statute permitted a clerk,
rather than a judge, to authorize the attachment; it contained no provision
for "an early hearing" to establish probable cause; and it required the affi-
davit to contain only conclusory allegations rather than specific facts upon
which a judge could act deliberatively.55
In remanding the case for further proceedings, the Di-Chem Court did
not specify how the statute should be revised except by noting its deficien-
cies in comparison to the sequestration procedure in Mitchell. Consistent
with Mitchell, however, the Court did not require prior notice and a hear-
ing but suggested that judicial authorization for the garnishment and a
prompt judicial hearing after the alleged debtor's assets had been gar-
nished would be sufficient to meet the requirements of due process.56
In summary, there are two lines of cases which should be considered in
determining the constitutionality of a cognovit judgment-those dealing
with the contractual waiver of due process rights and those evaluating stat-
utes permitting seizure of a debtor's property without prior notice and a
hearing. In Overmyer, the Court permitted a contractual waiver of due
process rights without defining a standard for judging its validity.57 In-
stead, the Court relied on contract law in finding that the cognovit agree-
ment was not unconscionable. In Swarb, the disparate bargaining power
of the parties prevented enforcement of the cognovit notes. Even though
there was no evidence of unconscionability in Overmyer, the Court sug-
gested that prompt post-judgment relief should be available to the debtor
to prevent mistaken deprivation. The adequacy of post-deprivation relief
was at issue in Mitchell and Di-Chem. Both cases guaranteed the right to
notice and a hearing but indicated that such protections can be provided
immediately after the debtor has been deprived of his property. Arguably,
the quality of the protections guaranteed by Mitchell and Di-Chem should
54. 419 U.S. at 606.
55. Id. at 606-07.
56. Id. at 607. Justice Powell emphasized that the "basic protection" due process af-
fords the debtor is a post-garnishment hearing before a judge at which the garnishor bears
the burden of showing probable cause for continuing the garnishment. He did not find it
necessary for a judge to issue the pre-garnishment writ. A clerk or other officer of the court
could issue the writ if the affidavit was properly filed. Id. at 611-12 and n.3 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in
property context, damage award can make a person whole, therefore post-deprivation rem-
edy may be all due process requires).
57. The Overmyer Court found that the criminal law standard for waiver of constitu-
tional rights--that it be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent-had been met in that case, but
it refused to adopt it as a controlling principle. 405 U.S. at 185-86. See note 80 infra.
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be afforded the cognovit debtor who claims after judgment that his waiver
of due process rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
In considering the constitutionality of California statutes authorizing the
use of cognovit notes, the Isbell court was faced with the unusual bargain-
ing situation of indigents negotiating with the government over welfare
funds. Consequently, California statutes containing provisions for con-
sumer and commercial debtors using cognovit notes did not directly apply
to the welfare recipients. In light of this unique factual situation and the
analytical approaches available in the prior law, the Isbell court could
have availed itself of a number of options for evaluating the due process
claims of the debtors.
II. ISBELL: A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DECISION OUT OF STEP
WITH THE SUPREME COURT
In Isbell, the court found the California cognovit statutes unconstitu-
tional because they failed to provide the debtors with notice and a hearing
prior to judgment to determine the validity of their waiver of due process
rights. By declaring the statutes unconstitutional, the Isbell court extended
the reach of its decision beyond the indigent debtors before the court to all
non-consumer users of cognovit notes, including corporate debtors. Only
consumers, protected under a separate statute, were unaffected by the deci-
sion.58 Instead of issuing such a broad rule of law, the court could have
held for the plaintiffs by three narrower routes. First, the court could have
evaluated the bargaining situation in light of Overmyer and Swarb and
found the cognovit agreements unconscionable; second, it could have com-
pared the bargaining situation of the indigent debtors to that of consumer
debtors and applied the standards of the California consumer statutes; or,
third, it might have considered the inadequacy of post-judgment relief
under California law in light of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
procedural due process.
In Swarb, the Supreme Court found that the disparate bargaining power
between low income consumers and their creditors made enforcement of
the cognovit notes unconscionable.59 Similar disparity in bargaining
power is arguably present in the case of welfare recipients negotiating with
the government. The debtors had no real choice in the bargaining situa-
tion since the county would threaten to sue if they refused to sign as di-
rected. The situation is potentially so intimidating that it is possible an
indigent might confess to allegations based on a clerical error of the wel-
fare department.
58. See notes 10 & 14 supra.
59. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text, supra.
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Because of this inequality in bargaining power, the situation of the indi-
gent debtors is arguably similar to that of consumers under California law.
Recognizing that consumers are often victims of overreaching creditors, 60
California law requires that a confession of judgment be filed with an at-
torney's certificate showing that the debtor has been counseled in the use
and legal consequences of a cognovit note.6' The Isbell court complained
that California law, as applied to non-consumers, did not provide for a
case by case determination of the validity of waiver; the law merely re-
quired the court clerk to enter judgment on documents which by them-
selves were insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver. 62 The court,
however, could have solved this problem by suggesting that an attorney's
certificate, required by the legislature for consumer cognovit debtors,
would be adequate proof of valid waiver in subsequent non-consumer
cases.
63
Had the court approached the facts of this case along the lines of con-
sumer law, it would have avoided possible repercussions in the commercial
use of cognovit notes. By limiting its holding to those cognovit statutes
pertinent only to the nonconsumer plaintiffs in this case, the court created
the anomalous situation whereby California's non-consumer debtors have
more substantive protection against cognovit judgments than its retail con-
sumer debtors. 64 Thus, a commercial debtor alleging coercion by a large
corporate enterprise will be granted a prejudgment hearing, whereas the
homeowner, whose cognovit note was executed in conformity with Califor-
nia law, will be granted only a post-judgment hearing-which, absent
proof of fraud, becomes unavailable six months after judgment is en-
tered.65
Still another approach available to the court was to evaluate the ade-
quacy of post-judgment relief provided under California law in light of
prior Supreme Court rulings.66 By finding a pre-judgment hearing consti-
60. See 59 Op. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 432 (1976).
61. See note 10 supra.
62. 21 Cal. 3d at 71, 577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
63. Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Traynor has suggested that judges
should consider forward-looking statutes when the narrow formulism of precedent is inade-
quate to provide a remedy. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 402 (1968).
64. The distinction between consumer and non-consumer waiver of constitutional rights
is arguably irrelevant. Waiver is the crucial issue in enforcing or voiding a cognovit agree-
ment and is best evaluated on its own terms. See Note, Fairness, Flexibility, and the Waiver
of Remedial Rights by Contract, 87 YALE L.J. 1057, 1081-82 (1978).
65. See note 17 supra.
66. The Isbell court found the available relief to be inadequate because it did not pro-
vide a remedy "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 21 Cal. 3d at 72, 577
P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374, citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 80.
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tutionally mandated, Isbell reached beyond the Supreme Court's determi-
nation in Overmyer that prompt post-judgment relief can provide sufficient
protection. Instead, the court could have merely found the California stat-
utes inadequate since they do not match the scope of protection guaran-
teed the cognovit debtors under Ohio law in Overmyer. Unlike California
law, the Ohio statutes required that the court clerk notify the debtor upon
entry of judgment so that the debtor could promptly attack it.67
In ruling out the use of post-judgment relief for cognovit judgments, the
Isbell court cited precedent of dubious persuasion. The California
Supreme Court relied primarily on the reasoning in Osmond v. Spence,68 a
1972 district court case decided on remand after Overmyer, to support its
conclusion that notice and a hearing must occur before judgment is en-
tered.69 Not only is this conclusion inconsistent with the result in
Overmyer, but it conflicts substantially with the reasoning in Mitchell and
Di-Chem, both of which require judicial authorization before deprivation
and prompt notice and a hearing after any taking of property. Di-Chem
was cited neither by the majority nor dissenting opinions.70 Mitchell was
distinguished as a case dealing solely with the temporary taking of prop-
erty in contrast to the final cognovit judgment against a debtor's non-ex-
empt property in Isbell.71 The California Supreme Court's reasoning,
however, appears faulty upon consideration that the sequestration in
Mitchell brought the goods within the control of the adversary creditor,72
whereas in Isbell, final disposition of the debtors' property remained
within control of the court. If the prompt post-judgment relief provided in
Mitchell were available to the cognovit debtors in Isbell, the debtors' prop-
erty interests arguably would be more protected than those of a consumer
whose goods had been repossessed.
While Mitchell and Di- Chem provide legal authority by which the Isbell
67. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
68. 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). See note 43 supra.
69. 21 Cal. 3d at 74, 577 P.2d at 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
70. Recent decisions of the California Supreme Court interpreting Di-Chem point out
that the opportunity to be heard can never be eliminated, but under certain circumstances a
post-deprivation proceeding will satisfy the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Kash
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 309, 562 P.2d 1302, 1310-11, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 53, 62 (1977); Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 209-10, 539 P.2d 774, 784-
85, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-25 (1975); Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 464-65, 535
P.2d 713, 724, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 596 (1975). See also Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 807-08, 553 P.2d 637, 640, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1976), appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977) (unique characteristics of mechanic's lien and stop notice as
to laborers and property owners meet the requirements of due process because of special
safeguards under California law).
71. 21 Cal. 3d at 71 n.5, 577 P.2d at 194 n.5, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374 n.5.
72. See note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
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court could have appraised the inadequate post-judgment relief provided
under California law, the question remains as to whether this kind of relief
would have sufficiently protected the interests of the parties. In Mathews v.
Eldridge,73 the Supreme Court provided a framework to assess the inter-
ests of parties and the protections due process requires.
[Olur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.74
These criteria provide a basis for further evaluation of the result reached
in Isbell.
The first of the three Mathews criteria requires consideration of private
interests of both creditor and debtor. In support of cognovit notes, credi-
tors argue that they expedite debt collection, protect creditors' rights by
preventing fraudulent disposition of debtor's property after default and
give the creditor inpersonam jurisdiction over the debtor.75 In the context
of commercial law, these arguments may have been persuasive one hun-
dred years ago, but today alternative procedures, less threatening to the
debtor, offer the commercial creditor equivalent advantages. For example,
today collection efficiency is facilitated by the holder in due course doc-
trine, debt security can be assured through common methods of providing
collateral, and retention of jurisdiction is available through long arm juris-
dictional statutes.76 In Overmyer, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
there are still situations in which cognovit notes serve a useful purpose in
the commercial world.77 In Isbell, however, the creditor was the govern-
73. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, a worker's Social Security disability benefits had
been terminated upon a finding that he was no longer disabled. Since disability benefits are
not based on financial need, the Court found an evidentiary proceeding unnecessary prior to
termination; written documentation from medical sources was more effective and less costly.
The Mfathews balancing test has been cited favorably in a number of recent due process
cases. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 675 (1977); Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S.
482, 494-95 (1976).
74. 424 U.S. at 335.
75. For a spirited defense of cognovit notes, see Auerbach, Cognovit Notes.: Should They
Be Abolished?, 80 COM. L.J. 97, 100-01 (1975).
76. See Note, Confessions of Judgment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1130-31 (1970).
77. See note 27 and accompanying text, supra.
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ment in a noncommercial situation and the debtors were indigents who
had confessed to welfare fraud. The cognovit notes they signed differed
from the more common type that bind debtors in advance of default.78
The Isbell debtors had admitted their obligations and signed the notes to
settle their debts.
The facts of this case are hardly similar to those in Overmyer. In Isbell,
there was disparity in bargaining power between the parties and no attor-
neys were present to assist in drafting the cognovit agreement. Although
the debtors did obtain reasonable repayment terms in consideration for
signing the notes and avoided protracted litigation to settle their debts, the
"bargaining" situation raises some questions as to whether the debtors
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their due process rights.79
In weighing the interests of the creditor and debtor under these facts, it can
be concluded that the government's interest in efficient debt collection is
outweighed by the debtor's right to some kind of procedural Safeguards.
The second of the Mathews criteria, the risk of erroneous deprivation
and the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, requires
consideration of the adequacy of the California laws governing cognovit
notes. Mitchell and Di-Chem indicate that post-judgment relief might be
adequate if judicial authorization precedes deprivation of the property in-
terest and post-deprivation relief is immediately available. Before a judge
can authorize judgment on a cognovit note, the documents presented to
him must indicate that the debtor has knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waived his right to notice and a hearing. It is unlikely that the hand-
written statements of the welfare debtors in Isbell are adequate to show a
valid waiver. The threat of a lawsuit no doubt induced their signatures. In
the case of consumers, California law has required an attorney's certificate
to verify the debtor's waiver. Similarly, the welfare recipients in Isbell
could have been provided with a legal services attorney. Such a procedure
would have given the debtors an opportunity to negotiate a suitable repay-
ment plan and avoided the cost of litigation. Since the validity of a
debtor's contractual waiver depends on the bargaining situation itself,80
78. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d at 76, 577 P.2d at 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377
(Richardson, J., dissenting). See note 19 supra.
79. Id. at 66, 577 P.2d at 190, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370. In his dissent, Justice Richardson
claimed the court could "reasonably presume" the waivers were knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary since they were in the handwriting of the individual debtors. Id. at 77, 577 P.2d at
197-98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Isbell, however, presents an
unusual use of cognovit notes. The debtors were in a quasi-criminal situation not unlike
plea bargaining. Since refusal to bargain with the county representative could result in a
criminal charge, they were entitled to increased procedural protection, particularly the
assistance of an attorney.
80. The Supreme Court has not developed a standard for determining the validity of
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this procedure would insure that adhesive cognovit contracts would be
avoided from the outset. In the event of erroneous deprivation, prompt
post-judgment relief would provide constitutionally adequate protection
for the debtor without destroying the usefulness of cognovit notes.
The last of the Mathews criteria, the fiscal and administrative burden
imposed by additional or substitute procedures, requires consideration of
the pre-judgment judicial hearing mandated by the court. By announcing
such an inflexible rule, the Isbell court is requiring unnecessary adversary
proceedings imposing additional costs on both courts and litigating parties.
Cognovit notes, knowledgeably contracted, expedite debt settlement and
keep debt litigation out of the courts. The California Supreme Court has
foreclosed legislative discussion on the commercial usefulness of cognovit
notes and, more specifically, has denied the county an opportunity to re-
form its method for recovering fraudulently obtained welfare funds more
efficiently. 8' If a party confesses fraud with the advice of counsel and is
given an opportunity to repay the government in reasonable installments,
expensive judicial hearings should not be necessary to protect the debtor's
rights.
Justice Richardson's comment in his dissent that the majority had
reached for a meat axe in a situation calling for use of a surgeon's scalpel 82
is descriptive of the court's error. There was ample legal precedent for the
court to invalidate the cognovit notes because of the inequality in bargain-
ing power between the parties. Similarly, the court could have invalidated
the notes on the basis that the post-judgment procedures under California
law fell short of due process requirements as set forth in recent Supreme
Court cases. In addition, the Mathews criteria furnish strong policy rea-
sons for not imposing the inflexible rule requiring a pre-judgment hearing
before entry of judgment on a cognovit note. Under the Mathews line of
reasoning, the court could have strengthened debtor protection for all cog-
novit users while at the same time assuring creditors of the court's ap-
proval of responsible use of cognovit notes.
contractual waivers of constitutional rights. See note 57 supra. Overmyer and Fuentes make
reference to commercial law principles and suggest that freedom from adhesive contracts is
a due process right. What constitutes an adhesive contract in any particular situation will
turn on the facts of that case. See Note, supra note 64, at 1062-63.
81. In Mitchell, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the impact of such an un-
bending rule on the cost of credit. 416 U.S. at 618-19 n. 13. If creditors are denied expedi-
tious remedies to enforce just debts, the cost of debt settlement at judicial hearings will be
passed on to the public. See Auerbach, supra note 75, at 101. The 1sbell court made no
assessment of the needs of creditors in making low cost credit available and of the need to
protect debtors from overreaching by unscrupulous lenders.
82. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d at 76, 577 P.2d at 197, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 377
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
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A better reasoned decision could have required that (1) judicial authori-
zation precede entry of judgment on a cognovit note; (2) every cognovit
debtor receive immediate notice of a judgment entered against him; and
(3) a prompt post-judgment hearing be provided at the debtor's option at
which the creditor would bear the burden of proving that the debtor had
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his due process rights. In
addition, the Isbell court could have suggested that an attorney's certificate
indicating independent advice as to the legal consequences of a cognovit
note would be sufficient evidence of a valid waiver. Such a solution would
be consistent with current procedural due process doctrine and would
fairly balance the needs of debtors and creditors. Furthermore, the Court
would have avoided the inefficient procedure of requiring an adversary
proceeding every time a creditor wishes to enforce his rights under a cog-
novit note.
Isbell is particularly significant since it puts greater restrictions on the
use of cognovit notes than those currently existing by statute in other large
commercial states. Although state laws generally restrict the use of cogno-
vit notes, most statutes have been drafted to permit responsible use by cor-
porate creditors. Isbell forecloses the drafting of similar statutes in
California and prevents commercial use of cognovit notes in the Nation's
largest state.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's expansion of procedural due process concepts has
been cautious and pragmatic. Recent decisions show that the Court is
hesitant to write hard-and-fast rules that may overly restrict commercial
enterprise and burden the courts with litigation. At the same time, the
Court has shown concern for the debtor by insuring prompt judicial inter-
vention upon deprivation of property without notice or an opportunity to
be heard. Considering past attempts by the Supreme Court to balance the
interests of debtor and creditor, it is difficult to justify the result reached in
Isbell. The inequality of bargaining power between the state and the indi-
gents created an inherently coercive situation justifying invalidation of the
cognovit notes. By mandating notice and a hearing prior to entry of judg-
ment, the court demanded more than the Supreme Court requires. As long
as the cognovit debtor has the benefit of judicial authorization prior to
judgment to determine the validity of his waiver of constitutional rights
and immediate notice and a hearing after judgment is entered, the cogno-
vit procedure arguably satisfies the requirements of due process. By pro-
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
viding more constitutional protection then is required, Isbell forecloses the
use of an efficient means of debt settlement in California.
Alan Vollmann
TAXATION-Interest and Depreciation Are Deductible
by the Purchaser-Lessor in a Sale and Leaseback of Real
Estate When the Transaction Is Formed for Bona Fide
Business Purposes. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561 (1978).
The sale-leaseback, a business transaction in which property is sold and
simultaneously leased back by the sellers, has become a popular alterna-
tive to conventional mortgage refinancing.' This arrangement has proven
particularly attractive to holders of depreciated property who are in need
of cash. 2 If the property owner sells an asset and leases it back, he may
retain possession of the structure, obtain instant liquidity, and deduct the
full amount of his rental payments. 3 The purchaser also assumes a more
favorable position than a mortgage lender by acquiring a fully depreciable
1. For an excellent overview of sale-leasebacks and the business, tax and legal motives
behind their formation, see Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-back of
Properi. Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. i (1948); Marcus, Real
Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 664 (1974).
2. While banks and other lenders are generally unwilling to finance more than 75% of
the asset's fair market values, the seller may be able to obtain 100% of the value of the
property under this method. See Comment, Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Agreements Under
Texas Usury Law. Circumvention or Sale, 7 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 821, 821-23 (1976). A
sale-leaseback may also be desirable because a company may be able to secure more capital
through the sale of an asset than through other methods of raising cash, such as an insurance
company loan or a bond issue. See Cary, supra note 1, at 6. Sale-leasebacks may also
provide liquid capital for an individual property owner who has a bad credit rating and is
unable to get a conventional loan. See, e.g., Kawauchi v. Tabata, 49 Hawaii 169, 413 P.2d
221 (1966).
3. I.R.C. § 162 provides in part:
(a) In general-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including ...
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of prop-
erty to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which
he has no equity.
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asset4 as well as a substantial "interest" return on the investment in the
form of rental payments. 5
The major disadvantage in selling rather than mortgaging is that ulti-
mate possession passes to the buyer.6 Accordingly, it is a common practice
for sellers to reserve the option to repurchase the property at some future
date. Although these options only afford the seller a right of first refusal,
their mere presence may lead to tax problems. If the repurchase price is
too far below the estimated future fair market value of the property, courts
have ruled that title was not effectively passed 7 and have prevented pur-
chaser-lessors from taking advantage of ownership-related tax benefits. 8
Judicial analysis of sale-leasebacks, however, has not been consistent.
In an early decision examining the tax nature of these transactions, the
Supreme Court looked solely to the instruments involved in determining
the true owner.9 Recognizing that these transactions may have valid busi-
4. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally Furner, Tax Aspects of
Sale Leasebacks, 35 ALA. LAW. 203 (1974). The purchaser may depreciate his entire basis,
which is his cost including any debt financing. See I.R.C. § 167; note 8 infra.
5. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 668-69; Comment, supra note 2, at 822-23. The pur-
chaser-investor may use the sale-leaseback as a technique to circumvent state usury statutes
by guaranteeing a rate of return higher than the interest rate allowed by state law. Addition-
ally, the purchaser-lessor is in a significantly better position than a mortgagee should the
seller-lessee go into bankruptcy, since he would hold clear title to the building, rather than
just a security interest. In the case of a default in the debtor's payments, the need for fore-
closure is precluded. Consequently, a sale-leaseback is often used when the property owner
is in a poor credit position and in danger of default. See Cary, supra note 1, at 7.
6. See Kelley, Sales and Leasebacks--Related Parties, 19 TUL. TAX INST. 370 (1970).
The author noted that this is the only cost the seller must pay for the benefits of immediate
cash and deductible rental payments. Id. at 370.
7. See, e.g., M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Martin v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731, 734 (1965). Closely related to the issue of a repurchase option
priced far below the fair market value of the appreciated real estate is the existence of a
major disparity between the original sales price of the property sold and leased back, and its
fair market value at the time of the sale. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544
F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (ownership interest never passed to purchaser where original
purchase price was nominal); see also Marcus, supra note 1, at 671-72.
Generally, when the option to repurchase is determined by the fair market value of the
property, or when it is less than reasonably certain that the option will be exercised, the
legitimacy of the sale-leaseback will be sustained. See In re San Francisco Indus. Park, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Arkansas Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 224 F.
Supp. 171, 181 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Resthaven Memorial Cemetery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43
B.T.A. 683, 687 (1941); Wilson, Sales and Leasebacks, 1964 S. CAL. TAX INST. 149, 163.
8. These benefits would be depreciation deductions under I.R.C. § 167 which provides:
"There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaus-
tion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) . . . of property
used in the trade or business," and mortgage interest deductions under I.R.C. § 163 which
provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness."
9. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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ness purposes, however, subsequent courts also began to look at the intent
of the parties for guidance.' 0 Recently, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States,"I the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue and upheld a sale-
leaseback with a highly favorable repurchase option because the parties
entered into the transaction for purely business motives.
Prohibited by state and federal banking regulations from carrying an
expensive asset on its books, Worthen Bank & Trust Company contracted
to sell Frank Lyon Company a newly constructed building and lease it
back for long term use as a banking headquarters.1 2 Lyon, seeking both a
diversification of investment and the tax benefits of real estate ownership,
provided a $500,000 down payment and secured a long term deed of trust
from New York Life Insurance Company for the remainder of the prop-
erty's purchase price. Worthen retained an option to repurchase the build-
ing at the end of eleven, fifteen, twenty and twenty-five year periods for an
amount equalling a six percent return on Lyon's investment compounded
annually, and an assumption of the outstanding balance of the mortgage. ' 3
This option, and the fact that the rental payments were set at the exact
amount necessary to amortize the deed of trust, led the Internal Revenue
Service to characterize Lyon not as the owner of the property, but as a
"conduit," funneling Worthen's mortgage payments to New York Life.
Consequently, it disallowed Lyon's ownership-related deductions upon au-
diting the company's 1969 tax return.14 After paying the resultant tax defi-
ciency, Lyon sued for a refund in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas. The district court sanctioned the deductions,
10. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974); Haggard
v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956); Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. 1952); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Egan, Sale-
Leasebacks. Protecting the Institutional Investor Against New Risks, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 199
(1977). The other major tangible asset which is frequently the subject of sale-leasebacks is
equipment. The issues presented, although similar, differ on a critical point since real estate
tends to appreciate over time, while equipment, due to wear, tear, and technological innova-
tion readily becomes obsolete. This distinction is of major importance when considering
repurchase options.
11. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
12. 435 U.S. at 563-68. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977); 12 U.S.C.
§ 371(d) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 265.2(f)(7) (1978). Worthen's original plan had been to finance
the construction and retain ownership of the building itself. The regulations, however,
forced the bank to change its plans. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 747
(8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
13. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. at 566. This arrangement is distinguisha-
ble from the typical sale-leaseback, usually formed to procure financing, in that it was se-
cured with approval from federal and state officials to comply with banking regulations.
14. See id. at 568.
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finding that the parties' intent was to create a valid sale-leaseback.' 5 Per-
suaded by the government's argument that the benefits, burdens and risks
of ownership never passed to the taxpayer, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's deci-
sion. 16
On certiorari, the Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit's hold-
ing and ruled that the government should honor the agreement as struc-
tured primarily because the parties had a bona fide business motive in
forming the transaction. The Court noted that neither party was the actual
owner of the building in any simple sense. Nevertheless, the majority
listed numerous factors which it considered persuasive of the transaction's
economic substance as a sale-leaseback.17 Dissenting, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that because Worthen retained control of the building by virtue of
the repurchase option, the taxpayer never acquired a sufficient ownership
interest in the property to claim depreciation.' 8 Justice White also dis-
sented, adopting the position advanced by the Eighth Circuit.' 9
The distinction between the Eighth Circuit's position and that taken by
the Supreme Court majority illustrates a legal schism between the courts
that have ruled on the tax treatment of sale-leasebacks. The Eighth Cir-
cuit's focus on the incidences of ownership reflects a more traditional and
objective approach for determining the legal effect of the agreement. In
contrast, the majority opinion focuses primarily on the subjective intent of
the parties as evidenced by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Given its departure from the traditional analytic framework,
Frank Lyon should have far-reaching repercussions for a growing number
of sale-leaseback transactions.
I. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP A WORKABLE APPROACH TO
CHARACTERIZE SALE-LEASEBACKS
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the owner of real estate is entitled to
a reasonable depreciation deduction to reflect the wear and tear on a
15. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9545 at 87,590 (E.D. Ark.
1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 501 (1978).
16. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S.
561 (1978).
17. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582-83 (1978). The majority was
persuaded by Worthen's inability legally to own the property, the fact that a state regulator
recommended Worthen's use of a repurchase option and a third party, the bona fide charac-
ter of the transaction, and the fact that Lyon was motivated by a legitimate desire to diver-
sify. See generally notes 67-71 and accompanying text infra.
18. 435 U.S. at 586-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 584 (White, J., dissenting).
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building used in business.20 In interpreting this provision, courts have his-
torically recognized that the holder of legal title may not be the owner of
the asset for tax purposes.21 As early as 1939, the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. F & A Lazarus & Co.22 addressed the issue of whether the
owner of real estate for tax purposes in a sale-leaseback transaction was
the purchaser-lessor or the seller-lessee. In Lazarus, a department store
conveyed legal title to a bank, leased the property back, and then claimed
depreciation on the building. The IRS disallowed the depreciation deduc-
tion on the ground that the statutory right to depreciate follows legal ti-
tle.23 The department store challenged this determination, alleging that it
was entitled to a depreciation deduction for the exhaustion of the capital
asset's worth. On certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the store's ob-
jection, reasoning that federal income tax law intended to afford a depreci-
ation allowance to the party who incurs the detriment from the wear of
business property.24 Although the party who holds legal title usually suf-
fers from the exhaustion of the asset, 25 other interested parties may also be
harmed. In Lazarus, the Court used an objective standard in examining
the interests which the respective parties held in the property and deter-
mined that the lessee suffered the loss of capital which it invested to gener-
ate income.26 Since the burden of ownership remained with the original
owner of the property, the Court restructured the sale-leaseback as a mort-
gage to allow the department store to take the benefit of a depreciation
deduction. 27
When applying the Supreme Court's objective analysis to similar trans-
actions, post-Lazarus courts soon began to recognize the parties' intent in
entering the agreement as one factor in determining the transaction's legal
nature. 28 For example, in Oesterreich v. Commissioner,29 the taxpayer
20. See I.R.C. § 167 discussed in note 8 supra.
21. See Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332 (1878); Commissioner v. H.F. Neighbors Realty
Co., 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936). In both these decisions, the courts held that a property
owner who conveyed his property by warranty deed was still to be considered the owner for
tax purposes.
22. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
23. Id. at 253. In this regard, the Commissioner was equating the legal owner of the
building with the property owner for tax purposes. But see note 21 supra.
24. 308 U.S. at 254.
25. See 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.06 (rev. ed.
1973).
26. See Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254 (1939).
27. Id. at 255. The Court emphasized that in tax law, the substance and not the form of
the transaction is binding. Accord, Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)
(transaction is viewed as a whole to determine its substance rather than its form).
28. See Renner & Maras, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1950); Hughes v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 797 (1952).
29. 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955).
[Vol. 28:394
Casenotes
leased property to a company which constructed a motion picture theatre
on it. Because the taxpayer wanted to receive the bulk of the consideration
in the early years of the lease, the parties agreed that the rental payments
would be high initially and taper off until the lease expired. At that time,
the lessee would have the option of purchasing the property for ten dol-
lars.30 Addressing the issue of whether the transaction was a lease or a
contract for the sale of land,3' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
divided its analysis into two parts. First, considering the intent of the par-
ties, the court recognized that by including the diminishing lease provision,
the parties meant eventually to pass ownership of the property to the lessee
in an orderly, cost-free manner. Since the taxpayer also received the busi-
ness benefit she desired, the court determined that Oesterreich was fully
aware that she was forfeiting ultimate control of the property in the proc-
ess. 32 Secondly, the court analyzed the legal effect of the lease to deter-
mine if the terms of the agreement coincided with the parties' apparent
desire to pass the ownership interest to the lessee. Since the lease con-
tained an option to purchase the property for nominal consideration, the
court assumed that the company would eventually redeem its equity inter-
est in the land by acquiring title to it.33 Given this presumption, known as
"the doctrine of economic compulsion, '34 the court held that the contract
conveyed title to the lessee from the outset. Looking to intended effect
rather than form, the Ninth Circuit recharacterized the transaction as a
sale. 35
Implicit in the Lazarus and Oesterreich decisions was the reliance upon
30. The option stated:
[L]essor promises and agrees that she will then, upon payment to her of the further
sum of ten dollars in hand, convey or cause to be conveyed by grant deed to the
lessee, free and clear of all encumbrances, all of the real property herein leased,
without further or other consideration.
Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
31. The issue of ownership had two possible tax ramifications. If the taxpayer, Oester-
reich, were the owner, the $12,000 received by her for the use of the premises would be
considered rent and consequently ordinary income. If the lessor were deemed to be the
owner, the money would be viewed as payments on an installment sales contract and thus
could be treated as capital gains. Id. at 801.
32. Id. at 802.
33. Id. at 803. "Equity interest" is the capital invested in the property by its owner.
34. This doctrine applies to a situation where the lessee cannot economically afford not
to exercise the repurchase option either to preserve his existing equity in the asset or because
of its generally favorable terms. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 673; Comment, supra note 2,
at 830-31. See, e.g., Commissioner v. H.F. Neighbors Realty Co., 81 F.2d 173, 175 (6th Cir.
1936) (sound business judgment must compel redemption of property worth $2,000 from a
funded debt of half that amount); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048
(9th Cir. 1976) (purchaser has an equity interest not prudently abandoned when purchase
price meets rather than exceeds fair market value of property).
35. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1955).
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the common law tax concept which requires that the entire interest in the
property must be conveyed for a valid sale to take place. 36 To determine if
common law criteria are met, the courts examine documents governing the
transaction to ascertain how the respective parties divide the property
rights.37 When a sale-leaseback agreement contains an option to repur-
chase for a price substantially below the fair market value of the appreci-
ated real estate, courts have viewed the transaction as a "loan secured by
the property involved" rather than a sale.38 This is justified by the pre-
sumption that the original owner retains constructive control over the
property by having the option of paying only a minimal fee to "reacquire"
it. Like the Oesterreich court, however, courts increasingly become willing
to identify the true substance of the transaction by looking beyond the
instruments themselves and focusing upon the business purposes which
prompt the parties to choose a sale-leaseback.
39
This combined objective-subjective approach was applied by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Frito-Lay, Inc.
v. United States.40 H.W. Lay & Company formed a subsidiary, Herlay, to
36. Cf Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (power to dispose is equivalent to own-
ership); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (transfer of property interest is valid where
there is complete transfer of corpus of interest); Corless v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (indi-
vidual with revocation power exercises control over property and retains its benefits). See
generally 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 20.02, 20.03, 20.15
(rev. ed. 1972).
37. See, e.g., Building Syndicate Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 725 (D. Ore. 1960),
aJ/'d, 292 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1961) (accounting reports, financial records and lease showed
all parties regarded taxpayer as owner of building); Alstores Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 363 (1966) (court considered space-occupancy agreement a lease to seller because
taxpayer-purchaser received benefits and burdens of ownership).
38. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939). See, e.g., M & W
Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971) (lessee had economic rather than
legal obligation to buy lessor's farm when an option valued at half the fair market value and
improvements had been made by lessee); Martin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731 (1965) (lessee
had no logical or economic reason not to exercise option where all rental payments were
credited to eventual purchase price). See also U.C.C. § 1-201 (1976). The Uniform Com-
mercial Code takes the position that, although the inclusion of an option does not make a
lease a security interest, a lease will be "intended for security" if the agreement stipulates
that the lessee has the option to become owner of the property for no additional considera-
tion.
39. See, e.g., Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (lease re-
structured as a sale where it was doubtful lessor intended to redeem property should lessee
fail to make rental payments); Beus v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1958) (rental
deductions taken under a lease-option provision on a farm negated after the testimony of
taxpayers showed parties entered the agreement for tax benefit purposes only); Breece Ve-
neer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1956) (transaction sustained
where business purpose for structuring transaction as a lease was to facilitate repossession
from tenant upon default).
40. 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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which it conveyed title to fourteen acres of land.4' Herlay then sold the
property to Jones Construction Company which constructed a plant on the
premises and leased both the property and land back to Lay. Herlay, in
return, received $49,824 and an option to repurchase the property for the
same price, exercisable when the twenty year lease between Jones and Lay
expired. The IRS disallowed Lay's rental deduction, claiming that the
company was acquiring an equity in the property through "rental" pay-
ments which merely amortized the total cost of the plant.42 Applying the
Oesterreich analysis, the district court reasoned that since the contract al-
lowed the company to recapture property worth $1,620,000 for $49,824, the
taxpayer actually retained control of the property through its subsidiary.43
Looking to the parties' subjective intent, the court interpreted Lay's crea-
tion of a subsidiary for the sole purpose of taking title to the land as evi-
dence that the company never intended to relinquish control of the
property.44 Consequently, the court labelled the transaction a mortgage in
substance although it was a sale-leaseback in form.45
A major breakthrough in the law of sale-leasebacks occurred twelve
years after Frito-Lay, when the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found a business purpose sufficiently valid to uphold a sale-leaseback
which appeared at first to be a mortgage. In American Realty Trust v.
United States,46 the debilitating effect of successive crippling tourist sea-
sons caused Helmsley, a real estate entrepreneur, to sell a Palm Beach re-
sort hotel to American Realty Trust (ART), a real estate investment
trust.47 In return, ART granted Helmsley a net lease,48 containing a repur-
41. Id. at 887 n. 1. Upon merger with the Frito Company, H.W. Lay & Company be-
came Frito-Lay, Incorporated. The new name was later substituted as the party plaintiff by
the pre-trial order.
42. Id. at 888. Specifically, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue treated $1,579,910,
the cost of the plant, as principle, and $23,698.65 as interest, yielding an interest rate of
4.33%.
43. Id. at 891. When Herlay exercised the option, the plant, worth $1,579,910, and the
land, worth $49,824, would return to Lay. The court believed that there was "no question"
that the option would be exercised.
44. Id. Intent of the parties, the court stated, was the "one true guide in determining
whether a transaction is a lease or a sale."
45. The court considered Lay and Herlay one party for tax purposes. Id. at 890-91.
Accord, Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945) (company and its subsidiary
treated as one entity for tax purposes when latter serves no other purpose than to take title to
property).
46. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
47. See Brief for Appellee at 4, American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194
(4th Cir. 1974). A real estate investment trust is an unincorporated association which holds
and manages real estate for the benefit of its shareholders. See 12 C.J.S. Business Trusts
§§ 1-5 (1938); I.R.C. § 856. These associations are afforded beneficial tax treatment pro-
vided they contribute at least 90% of their taxable income to the shareholders in dividends.
See I.R.C. § 857(a)(1).
48. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 665 n.3. The term net lease is an arrangement com-
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chase option which diminished over successive years. Six years later, the
sudden availability of "wrap around" financing49 enabled Helmsley to ex-
ercise the repurchase option with little expenditure of his own cash.50
Upon auditing ART's tax returns, the IRS viewed the transaction as a loan
in which the taxpayer took the building as collateral. Accordingly, it de-
nied all the investment trust's ownership deductions between the time
ART acquired the property and the time it returned it to Helmsley. 51 In
defending against a suit brought by the taxpayer to recover the assessed
deficiencies, the government, relying on Lazarus, argued that the benefits
and risks of ownership never passed to the taxpayer because the seller-
lessee was economically compelled to exercise the option.52 The Fourth
Circuit distinguished the transaction in Lazarus, in which the seller-lessee
never really intended to lose control of the building, as a loan "clothe[d]
m ..in the superficial garb of a sale-and-lease-back. '5 3 In contrast, the
court found that the facts and circumstances at issue demonstrated that
Helmsley repurchased the property not out of economic compulsion, but
to take advantage of the wrap around financing, a valid business purpose.
Persuaded that the depressed state of the Florida resort hotel market also
gave Helmsley a valid business reason for initially selling the building be-
low its apparent market value, the court concluded that the parties in-
tended to create a sale-leaseback from the outset.54 In upholding the
monly used in sale-leasebacks in which the lessee is obliged to pay all taxes, insurance,
property maintenance and other charges relating to the property.
49. See Comment, supra note 2, at 822 n. 11. Wrap around financing is an arrangement
in which a debtor (A) who holds a first deed of trust with a favorable interest rate, offers
(takes back) a second deed of trust to a party (B) who takes possession of the property
already encumbered. The second trust then encompasses the first one. If B defaults in pay-
ment of the second trust, the property reverts to A before it returns to the holder of the first
trust note (C). B is in a favorable position in that he receives financing at a competitive rate
up to 100% of the value of the property. While the specifics of wrap around financing are
not critical to an understanding of this case, it is important to note that this arrangement is
extremely agreeable to B, Helmsley in this case, and is rarely passed up when offered. Id.
50. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 47, at 5-6. At trial, Helmsley testified that he
originally had no intention of exercising the option, he secured it because it would be a "nice
thing to have," and that he would not have exercised it had the wrap around financing not
become available.
51. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1196 (4th Cir. 1974).
The consequences of this measure proved disastrous to ART, which lost its favorable tax
treatment as a real estate investment trust under I.R.C. § 857(a)(1). See notes 47 supra and
66 infra.
52. See Brief for Appellant at 18-19, American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d
1194 (4th Cir. 1974). Specifically, the government argued that the value of the property
exceeded the debt, thus compelling the borrower-lessee to redeem its interest.
53. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d at 1199.
54. Id. at 1198.
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transaction as formed, the court emphasized the importance of subjective
intent by treating it as a critical element in the tax characterization of a
sale-leaseback.
In Frank Lyon, however, the Eighth Circuit ignored this emphasis on
subjectivity in sale-leaseback analyses. The court strictly applied the
Lazarus benefits and burdens analysis, analogizing each meaningful inter-
est in the property to a "stick."' 55 In the Eighth Circuit's view, the proper
inquiry consisted of examining the contents of each party's "bundle" and
then designating the party with the most sticks as the legal owner of the
property. 56 Because the bank bore the burden of property maintenance,
and retained ultimate control of the building through a highly advanta-
geous repurchase option, the court concluded that Lyon's bundle was
"empty."' 57 Lyon's legal position was that of a mere conduit through
which the bank made its mortgage payments to the ultimate lender, New
York Life.58
The Eighth Circuit was unmoved by the reason for the arrangement, , e.,
Worthen's legal inability to own the building it needed for a banking head-
quarters.5 9 Rather, the court stated that the parties' intent was important
only insofar as needed to interpret their legal documents. 60 In this situa-
tion, the court believed that the allocation of meaningful interests in the
contract was so at variance with what the parties purported to create that
the court could disregard intent.6 ' By discounting intent as a meaningful
factor in the tax characterization of sale-leasebacks in favor of an entirely
objective approach, however, the Eighth Circuit directly conflicted with
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in American
Really Trust.
55. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435
U.S. 561 (1978).
56. 536 F.2d at 751. The term "bundle of sticks" was apparently derived from a phrase
in Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962), in which the Second Circuit stated
"[m]ost people trained in the law would agree that for many purposes one may define 'prop-
erty' as a bundle of rights, protected from interference by legal sanctions." 299 F.2d at 708
(emphasis added).
57. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d at 751-54.
58. Id. at 753.
59. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
60. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d at 751. Once a contract is drafted, the
amount of sticks in each party's bundle is an objective judicial decision, entirely unrelated to
the party's intent. Accord, Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977) (when
documents are clear and complete, they, rather than the parties' intent, govern the legal
characterization of a transaction).
61. 536 F.2d at 753-54.
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II. FRANK LYON: A SALE-LEASEBACK WITH A BUSINESS PURPOSE
In Frank Lyon, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute between the
circuits by adopting the Fourth Circuit's subjective approach into the tax
characterization of sale-leasebacks. In so doing, the court specifically re-
jected the Eighth Circuit's "bundle of sticks" analysis as a legally inade-
quate device with which to look behind the form of this transaction and
reveal its substance. 62 A closer look at the ramifications of a purely objec-
tive analysis suggests that the Supreme Court's rejection of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's approach was sound. The Eighth Circuit discarded the subjective
approach solely on the authority of Frito-Lay. The circuit court, however,
had assumed incorrectly that the Frito-Lay court's characterization of in-
tent as a "guide" to the transaction de-emphasized its role in the analysis.63
To the contrary, the Frito-Lay court specifically rejected any objective,
mechanical application of economic factors as clearly erroneous. 64 Fol-
lowing established judicial precedent, the district court in Frito-Lay recog-
nized that it should look beyond the documentation of the transaction and
consider all of the facts and circumstances which impacted upon the par-
ties' subjective intent.
In practice, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on purely objective factors to
determine the substance of sale-leasebacks would lead to inequitable re-
sults. For example, had the Fourth Circuit confined its inquiry to the
terms of the agreement in American Realty Trust, it would have been un-
able to consider the depressed state of the Florida resort economy or the
fortuitous appearance of wrap around financing. These factors, which led
the parties to enter into and subsequently disband the sale-leaseback
agreement, were crucial to an understanding of the business transaction
but were not apparent from the face of the agreement. Had the analysis
been limited to objective factors, the court would have ignored the bona
fide business purpose of the transaction65 and probably would have re-
62. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 576 (1978).
63. In interpreting the role of intent as set forth in Frito-Lay, the Eighth Circuit noted:
"[i]n Frito-Lay, the Court expressly stated that the intent of the parties was a 'guide' to the
true nature of the transaction, [citation omitted) not a component thereof." Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). The actual
language of the Frito-Lay court refers to intent as one of the most important components in
determining the tax nature of sale-leasebacks. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F.
Supp. 886, 890 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
64. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. at 890. In taking this position, the
Frito-Lay court relied upon an earlier Fifth Circuit case, Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d
745 (5th Cir. 1952). Benton, a case seemingly out of context with its time, specified that use
of an objective test was an error in emphasis, and that the subjective method was the only
proper approach to evaluate a sale-leaseback of equipment (a taxicab) used in one's busi-
ness. Id. at 752.
65. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1199 (4th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 28:394
Casenotes
scinded ART's preferred status as a real estate investment trust.66
As an alternative to the Eighth Circuit's approach, the Supreme Court
determined the tax nature of the transaction by considering which party
assumed the financial liabilities of real estate ownership and the reasons
for choosing this particular method. In determining that Lyon assumed
the financial liabilities, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the taxpayer would
remain liable on the deed of trust note to New York Life should Worthen
go into default or choose to "walk away" from the relationship at the end
of the initial twenty-five year lease.67 In this way he distinguished the two
party transaction in Lazarus in which neither party assumed a binding
financial obligation to an independant third party.68 The majority further
noted that Lyon had impaired its credit position in financing future busi-
ness projects by placing a long term debt on its books.69
In addition, the Court examined the parties' business reasons for enter-
ing into the sale-leaseback transaction. Like the Fourth Circuit in Ameri-
can Realty Trust, the Court believed that both parties had non-tax motives
for entering the arrangement. By purchasing the building, Lyon sought to
diversify its investment portfolio to include a real estate tax shelter.70 The
bank, which would have taken title to the building had it not been prohib-
ited by statute, chose to form a sale-leaseback on the advice of federal and
See also Burke, Why Some Sale and Leaseback Arrangements Succeed While Others Fail, 26
J. TAx. 130, 130-31 (1967) (sale-leasebacks arrived at in good faith and the result of arm's
length bargaining represent a necessary business operation and should be sustained).
66. The IRS disallowance of ART's depreciation deductions substantially raised the
investment trust's taxable income. Consequently, the amount distributed over the six years
became less than the requisite 90% of a real estate investment trust's taxable income which
must be distributed to its shareholders to qualify for preferred tax treatment under I.R.C.
§ 857(a)(1). The resultant increased tax liability amounted to $279,642.66, exclusive of inter-
est. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1196 n.8 (4th Cir. 1974).
67. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582-83 (1978). The majority
believed that the uncertainty of Worthen's future financial position, fluctuating interest
rates, and variation in property appreciation left too many contingencies for anyone to state
with any certainty that the option would be exercised. But see Mayerson v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 340 (1966) (a non-recourse debt does not change the character of ownership).
68. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 576 (1978).
69. Id. at 577. Although an outstanding long term debt may impair a company's ability
to borrow, the corresponding asset may be refinanced to provide a company with instant
liquidity. For further discussion, see Cary, supra note 1, at 11 and Rosenberg & Weinstein,
Sale-leasebacks." An analysis of these transactions after the Lyon decision, 45 J. TAx. 146, 150
(1976). The authors note that one of the major attributes of real estate ownership is the right
to refinance a tangible asset, thereby obtaining an immediate cash flow for business needs.
Id.
70. See 435 U.S. at 578-80. The majority recognized that the tax laws shape nearly
every business transaction; therefore, the fact that favorable tax consequences were taken
into account was no reason to disallow the transaction. Id. at 580. Accord, Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
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state officials who suggested this method as the best way to circumvent the
regulations. 7' Based upon its findings that Lyon assumed a business liabil-
ity in the deed of trust note and that Worthen sold the building for valid
business reasons, the Court concluded that Lyon was the owner for tax
purposes, and consequently reinstated its tax deductions for depreciation
on the building and interest on its mortgage payments. 72
In the Supreme Court's analysis, however, the role ascribed to intent
differed considerably from its treatment given by lower courts. Prior to
Frank Lyon, courts considered the parties' motives only as an element in
determining if the seller intended to pass irrevocable control of the prop-
erty to the buyer. In Oesterreich, for example, the lease was structured in
contemplation that the lessee would eventually receive the entire interest
in the property's res. Accordingly, the court relabeled the lease as a con-
tract for sale in accordance with the parties' clear intent to pass control of
the property.73 Likewise, the Frito-Lay court dissolved a sale-leaseback
when the company created a subsidiary solely to maintain possession of
the land and become the owner of the plant, thereby indicating no intent
ever to relinquish title to the land.74 In American Realty Trust, the sale-
leaseback was created in an unusually volatile economic atmosphere in
which a deflated repurchase price adequately reflected the value of the
building. The entrepreneur could not have reasonably forseen the availa-
bility of special financing which would enable him to recapture the hotel.
Therefore, the court upheld the transaction, reasoning that he expected to
lose possession of the edifice when he transferred its title.75 Although these
courts heavily weighed the parties' business purposes, they were willing to
sustain a transaction only when the parties met the common law require-
ment for transferring ownership by passing the entire property interest
from the seller to the buyer.76
In contrast, the Supreme Court sustained the transaction in Frank Lyon
even though the common law requirement for transferring property was
71. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. The Court was impressed with the tax-
payer's argument that it secured the option and sought an independent party to take title to
the building upon the federal regulator's recommendation. 435 U.S. at 582. Additionally,
the Court was influenced by the negligible effect that the transaction would have on the total
revenue collected by the government however it was construed. Id. at 580.
72. 435 U.S. at 583-84. See note 13 supra.
73. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1955). See notes 29-35
and accompanying text supra.
74. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886, 890-91 (N.D. Ga. 1962). See
notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
75. American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1199 (4th Cir. 1974). See
notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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not met. Worthen could redeem its equity interest in the building at any
time by exercising a repurchase option which was never intended to reflect
the fair market value of the property. Since the structure was readily
within its grasp for at least the twenty-five year term of the lease, the bank
never committed the property to Lyon's irrevocable control. By recogniz-
ing Lyon as the owner for tax purposes even though Worthen retained
constructive control over the premises through the repurchase option, the
Supreme Court's holding contravenes the common law distinction between
ownership and leasehold interest.
Essentially, the majority's argument is deficient because it failed to jus-
tify its departure from the common law. In this regard, Justice Stevens
offered a better reasoned opinion that is more compatable with the com-
mon law requirement of relinquishing control. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens noted that as long as the bank held the unrestricted, cost-
free power to revoke Lyon's title to the building, the taxpayer's ownership
interest in the property would be strictly limited.77 Pursuant to the agree-
ment, Lyon could receive no more than a six percent return on its $500,000
down payment should the option be exercised. 78 Since the taxpayer's
vested interest in the structure was unrelated to its value, Lyon would ac-
quire a depreciable interest in the property only when the bank forfeited
its right to exercise the option.79
The dissenting opinion is substantiated by the Lazarus holding, which
stated that the tax deduction for depreciation is intended to replenish the
party who suffers from the decline in a physical asset's worth.80 Since
"[Worthen's] opportunity to make a profit from the exercise of its repur-
chase option hinged on the value of the building at the time," 8' the bank
77. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584-88 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Cf Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (under common law, property interest
must be more than a bare right to receive a fixed income from property).
78. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. at 570 (1978).
79. Id. at 585 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens analogized Frank Lyon to a
case well rooted in the common law, Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). In Corliss, the
taxpayer transferred funds to a trust account in his wife's name, but reserved the power to
revoke or change the trust at any time. Deeming the taxpayer, and not his wife, the owner of
the trust account for tax purposes, the Court stated that "taxation is not so much concerned
with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual
benefit for which the tax is paid." Id. at 378. Consequently, the Supreme Court in Corliss
concluded that the wife would not acquire a taxable interest in the trust until "the plaintiff
failed to exercise the power he reserved." Id. Similarly, Justice Stevens believed that Lyon
would attain a depreciable interest in the building only when Worthen relinquished the
unrestricted cost-free power to exercise the repurchase option. Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254 (1939). See notes 22-24 and
accompanying text supra.
81. 435 U.S. at 586 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19791
Catholic University Law Review
would receive the benefits of property appreciation and suffer the burden
of the wear and tear on the real estate for as long as it retained the right to
regain control of the property. This is the type of investment for which the
depreciation deduction was intended. In contrast, Lyon's only "invest-
ment" in the building was its obligation on the deed of trust note to New
York Life. Since this "risk" was unrelated to the value of the edifice, it did
not suffer from the wear and tear of the physical investment and should
not have been a sufficient basis upon which to claim a depreciation deduc-
tion.
Similarly, the majority's decision to allow Lyon to take a deduction for
its mortgage interest payments was erroneous. Although, as the majority
stated, the taxpayer's financial position might have been threatened by the
third party note obligation, interest on indebtedness is only deductible by
the party who actually uses the money.82 The entire purpose of the
elaborate financing scheme was to provide Worthen with enough money to
construct a banking building.8 3 Consequently, the majority should have
realized that the bank was paying the interest on the building's mortgage
through its rental payments to Lyon, and therefore was entitled to a corre-
sponding deduction for the payment of the interest.
8 4
Apparently, Justice Stevens' approach was rejected because it would
have placed Worthen in the precarious position of deducting depreciation
and mortgage interest payments on a building it could not legally own.
85
Had the Court designated Worthen as the owner of the building for tax
purposes, the bank would have remained trapped between federal banking
regulations which prohibited it from taking title to the building, and fed-
eral tax law which would prevent it from deducting rental payments for
the use of a building it owned. In deeming Lyon to be the owner, and
thereby implicitly sanctioning Worthen's rental deductions as the build-
ing's lessee, the Court provided an equitable solution to Worthen's tax di-
lemma. By upholding the transaction as formed, however, the Court
indicated its willingness to provide the tax deductions of real estate owner-
ship to an entity which obtained none of the meaningful interests in the
property.
. 82. See Norton v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1973); accord, Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 585 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). In Justice Stevens' opinion, the transaction was, in substance, a loan to Worthen by
both New York Life and Lyon. The former creditor secured the debt with a first trust while
the latter took a second trust on the property. Thus, the "rental" payments to Lyon were
simply the payment of the entire mortgage which the taxpayer forwarded to the first trust
lender. Id.
85. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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Relying on Frank Lyon, future taxpayers may argue that a note obliga-
tion to a third party financer and a bona fide business purpose are suffi-
cient factors to support the form of a sale-leaseback even when the parties
do not transfer ownership interests in the property.86 In light of the sub-
stantial business and tax advantages provided by such a transaction,87 a
property owner may now be tempted to sell, lease back and deduct rental
payments on a building which may be easily reacquired through a nominal
repurchase option. This would enable purchasers to depreciate "rental"
property without acquiring the burdens of ownership. Such a liberal inter-
pretation of Frank Lyon, however, would abrogate the purpose of a depre-
ciation deduction, which is designed to replenish a property owner's loss
from the declining value of his capital asset. 88 If the purchaser's interest is
fixed by the price of a repurchase option which is independent of the rise
or fall in the property's worth, it would be illogical to allow him the benefit
of a tax deduction for the building's decline in value. Moreover, if the
seller-lessee may reacquire the building for a nominal price, a court will
likely determine that he is acquiring too much equity in the structure to
support his rental deductions.89 Consequently, business planners should
be aware that an overly broad reading may not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Rather, tax planners should recognize that Frank Lyon may be limited
to a factual setting in which independent federal regulations dictate the
form of a transaction.90 Such a case could arise, for example, if a federal
86. But cf. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). Just eight years before the
Frank Lyon decision, the Supreme Court in Davis was willing to discount entirely the rele-
vance of a taxpayer's business purpose in a stock redemption transaction under I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(1). 397 U.S. at 312.
87. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254 (1939). Business purpose
is an important consideration in the area of corporate reorganizations under I.R.C. § 368. In
the landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the Supreme Court stated
that "the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive,
was the thing which the statute intended." Id. at 469. Consequently, business purpose
should never be used to circumvent the result intended by the statute. See generally Chirel-
stein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968);
Lipnich, Business Purpose and Income Taxes.- From Gregory to Goldstein, 46 TAXES 698
(1968); Young, The Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAW.
275 (1969).
89. I.R.C. § 162 only allows rental deductions for "property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." For relevant wording of
section 162, see note 3 supra.
90. Cf. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). In a transaction unre-
lated to sale-leasebacks, Idaho Power attempted to depreciate the costs of construction
equipment which, for accounting purposes, it had capitalized in accordance with govern-
ment regulations. See I.R.C. § 263. Justice Blackmun, holding the taxpayer to the account-
ing principles selected by the regulatory agency, disallowed the depreciation deduction. He
reasoned that "where a taxpayer's generally accepted method of accounting is made compul-
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commission were to promulgate regulations forbidding a regulated com-
pany from purchasing real estate for use in its business. A company leas-
ing property under these regulations may nevertheless wish to acquire an
option to purchase the property for a nominal sum. In light of Frank
Lyon, a court is now likely to deem this a sufficiently valid business pur-
pose to sustain the form of the transaction with little regard for its eco-
nomic substance. Without a business purpose of this magnitude, however,
it is uncertain whether courts will adopt an approach in opposition to the
common law notions traditionally associated with real estate ownership.
Before permitting a seller to deduct rental payments or a buyer to deduct
depreciation, courts will more likely consider all the facts, circumstances
and business reasons behind the transaction to determine if the seller sur-
rendered all vestiges of control over the property. Therefore, in a factual
setting with a less compelling business purpose, courts will probably return
to an analysis of intent as merely an element in the tax characterization of
sale-leasebacks.
III.. CONCLUSION
By sustaining the tax deductions of real estate ownership for a party who
acquired none of the meaningful interests in the property, the Supreme
Court, in Frank Lyon, leaves tax law pertaining to sale-leasebacks in a
state of disarray. Although effectively halting the Eighth Circuit's attempt
to return to a purely objective analysis, the Supreme Court's use of the
subjective approach provides few guidelines to assist lower courts in char-
acterizing these transactions. Courts broadly construing the decision may
uphold the form of a sale-leaseback merely upon a finding of a compelling
business purpose. Other courts, however, by confining Frank Lyon to its
unique factual setting, may negate any transaction in which the meaning-
ful property interests have not passed from the seller to the buyer. The
latter approach, which on the balance is more consistent with legal prece-
dent, and the purpose behind tax code provisions, is more likely to be fa-
vored by subsequent courts. Until the lower courts address the issue under
different factual circumstances, however, tax planners may be well advised
to refrain from recommending a sale-leaseback transaction unless the tax-
payer cannot hold property due to federal regulations, or is willing to re-
linquish its ultimate control.
Fredric Zinober
sory by the regulatory agency. . . it is almost presumptively controlling of federal income
tax consequences." 418 U.S. at 15.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Reviewing Courts Restricted
from Imposing Procedures for Informal Rulemaking
Beyond Those Specified in Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act or Other Relevant
Statutes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
The scope of judicial review in administrative agency rulemaking has
been increasingly controversial in the last decade. This has occurred, in
part, because rulemaking has become a popular method for implementing
agency policy.' In contrast to retrospective adjudication on a case by case
basis, rulemaking offers agencies the opportunity to set policy prospec-
tively for an entire class of individuals.2 The Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) specifies two types of rulemaking: informal rulemaking under
section 553 of the Act; and formal rulemaking, set out in sections 556 and
557.3 The APA allows courts to review the substantive record compiled by
an agency during either type of rulemaking proceeding to insure that
before promulgating a rule, the agency has considered all of the relevant
material presented.4 The complexity of the scientific and technical data
that often comprise the substantive rulemaking record, however, has cre-
1. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:39 (1978). See also Wright,
The Courts and the Rulemaking Process Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375,
375-76 (1974).
2. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 6:39.
3. Section 553(c) states in pertinent part:
[A]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After con-
sideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules
are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). Sections 556 and 557 set forth formal hearing procedures including
powers of presiding officials, the burden of proof, elements constituting the record, and issu-
ance of findings and conclusions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1976). For a detailed discussion of
§§ 553, 556, and 557, see text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971), in which the Supreme Court interpreted the APA to require that courts'
substantive review of section 553 rulemaking consist of a searching and careful inquiry into
the facts, while allowing deference to agency judgment. For a discussion of the standards of
substantive review, see Wright, supra note 1, at 391-94.
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ated pressure on judges to focus upon the adequacy of the agency
rulemaking procedures used in lieu of reviewing the record.5 In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Supreme Court restricted the scope of procedural review available to
the courts, holding that absent specific Congressional direction, courts may
not impose rulemaking procedures upon administrative agencies which ex-
ceed those required by section 553 of the APA.7
In Vermont Yankee, the procedures used by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC or Commission)8 for licensing nuclear power plants were
reviewed in a consolidation of two circuit court cases. In the first case,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (Vermont Yankee), 9 the AEC had granted the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation an operating license over the objec-
tions of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a public interest
intervenor. The NRDC argued that the environmental effect of waste
reprocessing and disposal had not been considered when preparing the en-
vironmental impact statement required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).10 Shortly after approving the license, the
5. Although no statutory right to adjudication is involved, it has been suggested that
judges choose to focus on the adequacy of procedures used, when a contested issue of fact is
at the heart of a rule, to insure that the agency has not abused its discretion. See Claggett,
Informal Action--Adjudcaion--Rulemaking. Some Recent Developments in Federaldminis-
traiye Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78.
6. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee represents one of a relatively few administra-
tive law cases decided by the Supreme Court. In 1974, for example, the Court reviewed only
seventeen administrative law cases, less than three percent of the 570 administrative law
opinions subject to the Court's direct review. Thus, appellate courts operate in relative inde-
pendence from Supreme Court review on administrative issues. See Gardner, Federal
Courts andAgencies An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 803 (1975).
7. 435 U.S. at 543.
8. In the course of the Vermont Yankee litigation, the licensing and regulatory func-
tions of the Atomic Energy Commission were transferred to the newly created Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (NRC) under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5841 to 5849 (1976). The term "Commission" will hereinafter designate both the AEC
and its regulatory successor, the NRC.
9. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4361 (1976). Section 4332(C) states that to the fullest extent
possible, all agencies of the federal government shall:
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
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AEC announced its intention to develop a rule for considering the envi-
ronmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle.I After hearings on the pro-
posed rule,' 2 the Commission concluded that the environmental effects of
nuclear waste disposal were "relatively insignificant,"' 13 but that they nev-
ertheless should be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis for li-
censing individual reactors.' 4 The NRDC appealed,' 5 requesting that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit review
both the Vermont Yankee license and the AEC rulemaking. It challenged
the license, alleging that NEPA requirements had not been adequately
met. Further, the NRDC claimed that the rulemaking proceeding denied
it a meaningful opportunity to participate.' 6
Writing the opinion for the three-judge panel of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Bazelon found the Vermont
Yankee license invalid, reasoning that NEPA required the AEC to con-
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
11. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972). Section 553 requires the agency merely to publish no-
tice of its intention to promulgate a rule in the Federal Register, and to afford interested
persons an opportunity to present written comments relevant to the proposed rule. In Ver-
mont Yankee, the Commission exceeded the minimum procedures by conducting hearings
and by assigning a three-member hearing board to preside over the rulemaking proceedings.
Although the hearing did not involve discovery or cross examination, all participants could
be represented by counsel, and those giving oral statements were subject to questioning by
the panel. 38 Fed. Reg. 49 (1973). For a discussion of agency procedures beyond those
required by section 553, see notes 44-45 and accompanying text infra.
12. More than 40 individuals and organizations submitted written comments. In addi-
tion the panel heard two days of oral testimony, including testimony from Consolidated
National Intervenors, a coalition of 79 groups and individuals including the NRDC. 435
U.S. at 529.
13. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,190 (1974). This conclusion was presented in a one-page numerical
table entitled "The Summary of Environmental Considerations For Uranium Fuel Cycle,"
accompanied by a twenty page statement by the Director of the AEC's Division of Waste
Management and Transportation.
14. The rule provided that once the specific numerical values set out in the environmen-
tal survey table were factored into the cost-benefit analysis for an individual reactor, no
further discussion of the environmental effects of waste disposal was required in licensing
decisions for that reactor. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188 and 14,191 (1974). The AEC also decided
that since the environmental effect of the spent fuel cycle proved insignificant, it was unnec-
essary to apply the rule retroactively to the license issued to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation. Id.
15. Petitioners in the licensing proceedings were the NRDC and the New England Coa-
lition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc. Petitioners in the rulemaking proceedings were the NRDC,
the Consolidated National Intervenors, Inc., and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 637 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Hereafter, petitioners in both the licensing and
the rulemaking proceedings will be referred to as "NRDC".
16. 547 F.2d at 643. The intervenors did not question the Commission's authority to
proceed under section 553, but argued that in particular circumstances more formal proce-
dures should be used. Id.
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sider the environmental effect of the spent fuel cycle in issuing the Li-
cense. 17 In addition, he found that although the agency employed even
more detailed procedural requirements than those set forth in section 553,
the rule subsequently promulgated was invalid because the procedures
used did not sufficiently ventilate the issues.' 8 Although the opinion ac-
knowledged prior case law holding that a reviewing court must refrain
from requiring an agency to use specific procedures except under ex-
traordinary circumstances,19 the decision nevertheless overturned the rule
for the inadequate procedures employed in the rulemaking process. 20
On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the AEC acted within
its statutory authority in considering the environmental impact of the spent
fuel process in the Vermont Yankee license.21 In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court maintained that as long as the procedures prescribed
in section 553 of the APA were followed, the appellate court could not
17. Id. at 641. The court viewed the generation of large quantities of radioactive waste
materials that remain toxic for centuries as an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources" which must receive detailed analysis under NEPA. See note 10 and accompany-
ing text supra.
18. Id. at 653-55. Judge Bazelon claimed that the hearing procedures employed did not
create a genuine dialogue on the issues sufficient to establish an adequate record upon which
to base the rule. The opinion suggests a number of procedural devices that might have been
used including informal conferences among staff and intervenors, the use of technical advi-
sory committees, limited cross examination, and agency funding of independent research by
intervenors. After noting these devices, howeyer, the court stated that it was not requiring
the use of any of these procedures on remand. Id. at 653.
19. 547 F.2d at 644 (citing FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326
(1976)). For examples of extraordinary circumstances recognized by reviewing courts see
note 53 and accompanying text infra.
20. The ambiguity of the majority opinion becomes apparent after considering the sepa-
rate opinions. Judge Bazelon rendered a separate statement directly advocating the need for
courts to focus on agency procedures in certain complex areas as an alternative to interpret-
ing technical facts. Id. at 655. Judge Tamm also submitted a separate statement, concurring
in the result, but focusing solely upon the inadequacy of the record generated rather than
upon the procedures used by the AEC. Id. at 658. Although all panel members agreed that
the case should be remanded to the Commission, they disagreed about the reasons for re-
mand. The majority opinion thus represents a compromise statement, containing language
which attacks both the adequacy of the procedures and the sufficiency of the record. This
compromise caused the Supreme Court to question the actual basis for the remand. Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 539-41 (1978). The Supreme Court found that "while the matter was not entirely free
from doubt, the majority of the Court of Appeals struck down the rule because of the per-
ceived inadequacies of the procedures employed in the rulemaking proceedings." Id. at 541.
21. 435 U.S. at 539. Justices Blackmun and Powell took no part in the consideration or
decision of the cases. Nevertheless, since both Justices Blackmun and Powell subscribed to
the position taken by the majority in earlier cases, it is doubtful that their presence would
have altered the outcome in Vermont Yankee. See discussion of United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972) and United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410
U.S. 224 (1973) in text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
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overturn agency rulemaking on procedural grounds. The Court then re-
manded the rule to the court of appeals to determine whether it was sup-
ported by the agency's substantive record.22
In the second case, Aeschilman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,23 local environmental groups challenged construction per-
mits for two nuclear power plants in Midland, Michigan issued after notice
and extensive hearings.24 On administrative appeal, the environmentalists
raised two issues. First they argued that the AEC failed to consider energy
conservation as an "alternative to the proposed action" as required by
NEPA;25 second, they maintained that the AEC refused to allow discovery
to compensate for an incomplete record on a matter involving the safety of
the plants. 26 Both objections were denied by the Atomic Safety and Li-
censing Appeals Board. The request for discovery was refused on the
ground that the record showed the AEC complied with NEPA and that it
was inappropriate to probe the reasoning of individual advisors to an
agency. 27 Further, the Appeals Board found that energy conservation had
implicitly been considered in cost-benefit analyses and demand projections
for the plants.28 On a motion to reclarify the licensing decision in light of
a subsequent case, the Commission affirmed the Appeals Board decision,
noting that the environmentalists had failed to show energy conservation
to be a feasible alternative to plant construction. 29 In its determination,
the Commission set forth a three-part test for determining whether energy
conservation should be considered as an alternative to the construction of
a nuclear facility. First, energy conservation had to curtail the demand for
22. 435 U.S. at 549. The Supreme Court adopted the view expressed in Judge Tamm's
separate statement that the rule should stand or fall on the sufficiency of the substantive
record. Id. This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's past opinions limiting the
scope of judicial review to substantive issues. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text infra.
23. 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rey'd, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
24. More than thirty days of hearings were held by the Commission on health, safety,
and environmental issues related to the Midland plants. See 547 F.2d at 624 n.2.
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(C)(iii), 4332(D) (1976), quoted in part in note 10 supra. The
environmentalists claimed that the Commission's failure to consider energy conservation as
an alternative to plant construction rendered the environmental impact statement fatally
defective. 547 F.2d at 625.
26. In making their report to the AEC on safety factors affecting the Midland plant, the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), a group of experts acting as consul-
tants to the Commission, referred to "[other problems related to light water reactors...
cited in previous ACRS reports." Id. at 630. The environmentalists asserted that they could
not determine the "other problems" to which the committee was referring and requested
discovery including depositions of individual committee members. id.
27. 6 A.E.C. 331, 339-41 (1973).
28. Id. at 350-56.
29. 7 A.E.C. 19 (1974). The rehearing was held in light of a prior Commission decision
mandating the consideration of energy conservation in licensing proceedings. See In re Ni-
agara Mohawk Power Corp., 6 A.E.C. 995 (1973).
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electricity to a level that would make the nuclear plants unnecessary. Ad-
ditionally, energy conservation had to be an available alternative, and
finally, the impact of energy conservation had to be susceptible to a rea-
sonable degree of proof.30
Chief Judge Bazelon, again writing for the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, classified the Commission's threshold test as arbitrary
and capricious. Furthermore, although he agreed with the Appeal Board's
determination that discovery from individual AEC advisors was not
proper, 3' he found that a more complete explication of the record was
needed. 32
On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court found the AEC's threshold test
well within its procedural discretion in that it required the intervenors to
make a showing sufficient to cause reasonable minds to investigate fur-
ther.33 In addition, the Court considered the remand for further elabora-
tion of the record an unjustifiable intrusion into the agency's
administrative process since the primary purpose of the material in ques-
tion was to provide technical advice to agency decisionmakers rather than
to the public.
34
30. 7 A.E.C. 19, 24 (1974). The Commission's test was derived from Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sufficient information
must be provided to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives). See also Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 800-801 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 1975) (an environmental
impact statement must discuss alternatives to proposed federal action which may partially or
completely meet the goals under consideration).
31. Aeschilman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622, 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Bazelon viewed the Commission as having the re-
sponsibility to take the initiative in considering environmental issues to fulfill its statutory
responsibility under NEPA. He claimed that although the Commission derived the thresh-
old test properly from the "rule of reason" set out in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972), see note 30 supra, the entire burden of compil-
ing evidence should not be placed on the intervenors. Instead, intervenors should be re-
quired to raise "colorable" alternatives, with the burden thereafter shifting to the
Commission to investigate whether the alternative at issue is worthy of detailed considera-
tion in an environmental impact statement. 547 F.2d at 628.
32. As a result of the court's decision on both issues, the construction permit for the
Midland reactors was remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. 547 F.2d at
632.
33. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 554 (1978). The Court noted that by the Commission's own admissions, the
threshold test was equated to the burden of a prirafacie case in civil litigation. Id. The
Court found that the intervenors failed to meet even the minimal test because, although the
Commission invited further clarification of their contentions, the intervenors failed to pres-
ent traditional findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their case. Id.
34. Id. at 556. The Court emphasized that despite their technical purpose, both the
committee report and companion document discussing the "other problems" were a matter
of public record. Further, Justice Rehnquist noted sharply that although the putative reason
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The Supreme Court's reversal of the District of Columbia Circuit in the
consolidated cases climaxed ten years of controversy between these courts
questioning the limits of judicial review. In rendering its decision, the
Supreme Court imparted a severe reprimand to the court of appeals for its
unwarranted intervention into agency rulemaking.35 Consequently, Ver-
mont Yankee leaves no doubt that the appellate courts' ability to entertain
challenges to section 553 rulemaking procedures will be limited severely.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS
During the last four decades, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
administrative agencies may formulate their own rulemaking procedures
without intrusion from reviewing courts.36 One of the earliest cases com-
menting upon intervention by appellate courts in agency procedures was
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.37 In concluding that courts may review
errors of law but may not interfere with agency procedures, Justice Frank-
furter observed that "Congress which creates and sustains these agencies
must be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal. Inter-
ference by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits of re-
sponsibility in administrative agencies."' 38 Although the Court deferred to
the power of administrative agencies to establish procedures for decision-
making, Congress and members of the legal community became concerned
about the lack of standardized procedures, particularly in light of agency
growth. In order to introduce greater uniformity, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.39
for the appellate court's remand of the committee report was that the public could not un-
derstand it, not one member of the "public" had complained that the report was incompre-
hensible. Id. at 557.
35. Id. at 525.
36. See, e.g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (reviewing court may not re-
quire the FCC to hold hearing materials confidential if agency procedures do not mandate
confidentiality). See also note 49 infra for earlier case law.
37. 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). Pottsville involved the right of the FCC to determine
procedures for considering competing applicants for a radio license. The Supreme Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit's determination that the FCC had erred in simultaneously consid-
ering competing license applications which had been submitted at different times. Id. at
145.
38. Id. at 146.
39. Ch. 744, 60 Stat. 809 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 to 559 (1976)). Orig-
inally administrative agencies were viewed as representatives of the public interest.
Through case by case adjudication, agencies applied their general regulations to persons or
corporations for the welfare of the public. Recently, however, the role of agencies has
evolved into that of an umpire arbitrating between competing interest groups. For a discus-
sion of this evolution, see Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in Administrative
Proceedings, 29 AD. L. REv. 1, 17 (1977).
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A. The Administrative Procedure Act. Blueprint for Agency Rulemaking
The Administrative Procedure Act outlines two methods through which
an agency can implement policy. Sections 556 and 557 describe a formal
adjudicatory process through which a proposed agency action is made the
subject of a formal hearing, employing rules of evidence and cross exami-
nation of witnesses similar to those used in a court of law. 40 Seldom used
today, formal rulemaking is employed only in ratemaking and when en-
abling statutes require a determination on the record.4' Section 553 de-
scribes an informal notice and comment process requiring an agency
merely to provide notice of the proposed rule, an opportunity for inter-
ested parties to submit written comments or, under certain circumstances,
oral testimony, and a concise and general statement of the basis and pur-
pose of the rule.42 No provision is made in section 553 rulemaking for a
mandatory oral hearing or for the cross examination of witnesses. Thus,
unless it is prohibited by statute or by the existence of questions of fact,
informal rulemaking is the primary procedure used by agencies. 43
Although not specified in the APA, agencies have developed a third
rulemaking process which affords more formal procedures than section
553, but falls short of a full-blown adjudicatory process. Termed "hybrid"
rulemaking, or "notice and comment plus," these procedures may include
an informal hearing allowing cross examination of witnesses, informal
meetings among agency staff and intervenors, discovery, and other devices
beyond those required by section 553. 44 Hybrid rulemaking is frequently
used by agencies, even though not required by Congress, when controver-
sial social issues are involved.45
40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1976).
41. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 6:39.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See note 3 supra for the pertinent statutory provisions.
43. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 6:39. Professor Davis refers to section 553
rulemaking as "one of the greatest inventions of modem government." Id.
44. Claggett, supra note 5, at 78; Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption ofRules of Gen-
eral Applicability" The Need For Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60
CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1313-20 (1972); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative
Procedure Act.:A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 433-36 (1975). See
also Wright, Court o/Appeals Review ofFederal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L.
REV. 199 (1974); Wright, supra note 1, at 375; Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 234-49 (1974); Note, The JudicialfRole in Defining Procedu-
ral Requirementsfor Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. REV. 782 (1974). Congress can pro-
vide for hybrid rulemaking by statute. For example, section 403(d) of the Department of
Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7173(d) (West Supp. 1977), states that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may allow submission of written questions with
respect to disputed issues of fact to parties participating in the rulemaking.
45. See Wright, supra note 1, at 378. Judge Wright attributes the trend toward using
more than minimally required statutory procedures as an agency reaction to the preference
of reviewing courts for trial-like procedures. Id.
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Although the APA allows courts only limited procedural review to in-
sure that all procedures required by law are followed, it provides for exten-
sive judicial review of the substantive basis for agency rules.46 Reviewing
courts may determine whether an administrative agency has established
some basis for its action in the record. Under sections 556 and 557 of the
Act, an agency rule must be supported by substantial evidence contained
in the written hearing record.47  In comparison, under section 553
rulemaking, the court can disturb an agency's decision only if it is'clearly
arbitrary and capricious. 48
B. Divergent Theories of Judicial Review
Despite early case law indicating that the formulation of procedures
should be left within the discretion of administrative agencies49 and the
congressional mandate in the APA, since the mid-1960s, appellate courts,
led by the District of Columbia Circuit, have taken an increasingly activist
role in affecting agency policymaking. During this same period, the
Supreme Court has moved in the opposite direction, seeking to limit the
extent of judicial intervention in agency actions.5°
Initially, the APA was the primary vehicle for judicial intervention. In
1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ruled that in particular circumstances, appellate courts could require
the use of additional procedures beyond those in section 553 to allow
greater public participation in agency decisionmaking. In American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,51 the Civil Aeronautics Board
promulgated a rule under section 553 permitting only cargo carriers to of-
fer wholesale rates on reserved airfreight space. Several combination pas-
senger-cargo airlines objected to the rule, claiming that the CAB should
have used an adjudicatory hearing process since the rule generally affected
their rights under the Federal Aviation Act. Although finding the proce-
46. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1976).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
487-88 (195 1) (reviewing courts may set aside an NLRB decision when it cannot find sub-
stantial evidence in the record supporting the decision).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). For a discussion of the relative strengths of these tests
see Verkuil, supra note 44; Wright, supra note 1, at 392-93.
49. See, e.g., CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 323 (1957) (reviewing courts may not
dictate procedural requirements in an administrative agency enforcement proceeding); Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933) (Congress delegates to ad-
ministrative agencies the discretion to determine hearing practice).
50. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); FCC v. Schreiber, 381
U.S. 279 (1965).
51. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
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dures used by the CAB sufficient, the court noted in passing that basic
considerations of fairness may require procedures beyond those specified
by Congress in the APA.52 Building upon this reasoning, the same court,
joined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, subse-
quently held in a number of cases that section 553 procedures are not suffi-
cient to ventilate complex or controversial issues, particularly when
questions of fact have a vital relationship to the reasonableness of the rule
and are readily susceptible to the taking of evidence.
53
The passage of NEPA in 1969,54 requiring federal agencies to account
for environmental factors in their policymaking, provided reviewing courts
with an additional tool for scrutinizing agency actions. Although the
Supreme Court ruled that NEPA adds neither to APA procedural require-
ments nor to those mandated by agency statutes, 55 NEPA nevertheless im-
poses upon agencies the obligation to prepare detailed environmental
impact statements preceeding any major federal action which significantly
affects the environment. The breadth and scope of NEPA's provisions has
invited considerable judicial interpretation concerning agency compliance
with both the letter and spirit of NEPA requirements. In this regard, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
given a broad reading to agency responsibilities under the statute. In one
of the earliest NEPA cases, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v.
AEC,56 the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the AEC's rules gov-
erning the evaluation of environmental issues in agency licensing proceed-
ings. The court found that the AEC's "crabbed interpretation of NEPA
[made] a mockery of the Act,"57 and remanded the rules to the Commis-
52. 359 F.2d at 632-33.
53. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (use of section 553 proce-
dures to establish minimum rates for transporting various liquid fuels by pipe held insuffi-
cient, since the Natural Gas Act required ratemaking to be based upon substantial evidence
in the record); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) (section 553
procedures used in approving state air quality implementation plans would have been
insufficient if the state hearings had not been adequate to permit judicial review); Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (use of section 553 to establish
tomato marketing controls held insufficient since the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 required oral presentation).
54. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4361 (1976)).
55. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975); United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973). See also Wright, New Judicial Requisites for Informal
Rulemaking Implicationsfor the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REV.
59, 60 (1977). Judge Wright asserts that there is no principled distinction between substan-
tive and procedural requirements for informal rulemakings as defined in section 553 of the
APA and the NEPA requirements for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement.
56. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 1117.
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sion for further consideration.
Although the Supreme Court did not review Calvert Clffs', it limited the
appellate court's broad interpretation of procedural review under NEPA in
a subsequent case, Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 58 In Sierra Club, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had ruled in
favor of environmentalists who argued that the Department of Interior had
failed to fulfill its NEPA responsibilities by neglecting to prepare a re-
gional environmental impact statement in connection with its coal leasing
activities.59 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reversed, holding
that procedural requirements including regional environmental analyses
are required only when specifically mandated by NEPA.60
Given this narrow interpretation of NEPA, judicial activists were again
forced to rely upon the APA and enabling statutes as the principal method
for obtaining review of agency policymaking. Prior to Sierra Club, how-
ever, the Burger Court already had begun to narrow the scope of judicial
review under the APA. In two controversial decisions, the Supreme Court
stated in general terms that section 553 of the APA set the maximum pro-
cedural requirements which Congress was willing to impose upon adminis-
trative agencies. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Co.,61 the
Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated a rule pursuant to the "no-
tice and comment" rulemaking procedures of section 553 despite an Inter-
state Commerce Act requirement that rulemaking be made after a
"hearing."'62 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, found the
procedures to be sufficient. The following term, the Court extended this
view in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway.63 In a six to two deci-
sion, Justice Rehnquist held that with regard to an ICC rule governing
rates for freight car use, the notice and comment procedures set out in
section 553 were likewise sufficient.64 In both opinions Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that the term "hearing" in the Interstate Commerce Act need not
58. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
59. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
60. 427 U.S. at 405-06.
61. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
62. See 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (1970).
63. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
64. Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented, arguing that unlike Allegheny, which in-
volved the promulgation of car service rules which are an exercise of the agency's legislative
rulemaking authority, Florida East Coast involved rules which concerned factual disputes
and created a new financial liability and therefore required the agency to proceed under the
more formal rulemaking procedures of section 556. Id. at 251-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For a critical analysis of the Court's opinion, see ABA Judicial Review Committee of the
Administrative Law Section, Recent Developments in Interpretation of the AP,4: Florida East
Coast and its Progeny, 28 AD. L. REV. 91 (1976). The Committee views Justice Rehnquist's
reading of the language of sections 556 and 557 as unduly restrictive. Id. at 93.
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be construed to mean "hearing on the record," thereby triggering the more
formal rulemaking procedures governed by sections 556 and 557 of the
APA.65 Not until Vermont Yankee, however, was the Supreme Court con-
fronted with a specific instance in which a reviewing court, relying on its
power to review under the APA, attempted to impose its own notions of
proper procedure upon an agency's rulemaking.
II. THE FUTURE OF PROCEDURAL REVIEW
The strongly worded Supreme Court opinion, characterizing the appel-
late court's action in Vermont Yankee as "judicial intervention run riot,"
evidenced the Court's desire to put an end to judicial activism through
procedural review.66 The Court reasoned that nothing in either the APA
or NEPA grants reviewing courts the unfettered right to impose rulemak-
ing procedures beyond those provided in section 553 of the APA, if the
agencies have not chosen to grant them.67 In line with its prior decisions,
the Supreme Court abided by congressional intent to allow administrative
agencies the freedom to set their own procedures within the framework of
statutory requirements and the APA.68
In restricting procedural review, the Supreme Court foreclosed the judi-
cial imposition of safeguards against arbitrary agency actions. As previ-
ously used, procedural review enabled courts to tailor agency procedures
to the administrative action at issue. For example, a reviewing court could
insist upon more rigorous procedures to accompany agency rules promul-
gated for site selection of nuclear reactors than it could for federal office
buildings. Moreover, procedural review provided a means of securing
agency accountability in decisionmaking. Since agency rulemaking often
involves complex technical issues, procedural review allowed courts to
guarantee the substantive adequacy of rules without delving into the intri-
cacies of the record. In addition, because section 553 rulemaking merely
requires "consideration" of comments submitted, courts could utilize pro-
cedural review to require decisionmakers to pay more than lip service to
the comments of their critics when promulgating a rule in a substantively
complex area.
Despite the advantages accompanying judicial review of agency proce-
dures, the Supreme Court was more concerned with the ramifications at-
65. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Co., 406 U.S. 742, 758 (1972).
66. 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978).
67. Id. at 548.
68. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 28:411
Casenotes
tending unbridled procedural review.69 Vermont Yankee was an ideal
forum for the Supreme Court to reemphasize its preference for judicial
restraint in the review of agency decisions. The consolidated cases pro-
vided an opportunity for zealous environmentalists to press their claims
through the activist stance of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Although in Vermont Yankee the court of
appeals paid homage to the prohibition against procedural review con-
tained in Supreme Court precedent, it in fact remanded the case to the
Commission for a lack of adequate procedures. 70 If for no other reason,
this aspect of Judge Bazelon's opinion invited Supreme Court review.
7
'
Similarly, the behavior of environmentalists in Aeschilman invited
Court comment. After subjecting the construction permit to seven years of
extensive agency and court review, the environmentalists objected to an
unclear reference in a report on the proposed Midland plants. Allowing
environmentalists' objections would effectively block the building of plants
planned pursuant to congressional policy, reasoned the Court. Further,
public intervenors would receive greater power than had ever been antici-
pated under the APA or NEPA.72
Had both the D.C. Circuit's judicial activism and the intervenors' de-
mands occurred when an agency had compiled a substantive record suffi-
cient to support a rule under section 553, the Court's decision would not
have been so significant. The record in Vermont Yankee, however, con-
sisted of a twenty-page statement by a staff analyst supporting the conten-
tion that environmental effects of nuclear waste were "relatively
insignificant." Although both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the record was inadequate,73 the Supreme Court nev-
ertheless reasoned that a remand for insufficient procedures did not neces-
sarily follow. Harking back to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Pottsville,
the Court reasserted that Congress, not the courts, must be trusted to cor-
rect agency deficiencies.74 In line with this reasoning, the Supreme Court
69. See Wright, supra note 1, at 386-90. Judge Wright maintains that neither the argu-
ments in favor of tailoring agency procedures to the importance of the issue, nor the need for
agency accountability can withstand close scrutiny.
70. 547 F.2d at 653-55. See notes 18 & 20 supra for a discussion of the opinion.
71. In fact, in narrowly interpreting the holding in Vermont Yankee to pertain only to
the question before the Court, Professor Davis argues that the Court's opinion may have
been "mainly a reaction to Bazelon's focus on procedure." K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 6:35.
72. 435 U.S. at 548.
73. 547 F.2d at 655. The court of appeals deemed the licensing proceedings, based on
the cursory development of the facts, capricious and arbitrary. Id. While not ruling directly
on the sufficiency of the record, the Supreme Court noted references in both the majority
and Judge Tamm's opinions to its inadequacies. 435 U.S. at 549.
74. 435 U.S. at 543-44 (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940)). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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remanded the Vermont Yankee rule to the court of appeals for a determi-
nation of whether it was supported by the record.
Although both courts remanded the rule, an important distinction exists
between the appellate court's remand on procedural grounds and the
Supreme Court's remand on substantive grounds.75 A remand for inade-
quate procedures allows a reviewing court to dictate the time and effort
that an agency must expend responding to public input in promulgating a
valid rule. Allowing courts to exercise this degree of control over agencies
provides the judiciary with a substantial check over the executive and leg-
islative branches of government. On the other hand, a remand because of
an inadequate record merely allows a reviewing court to dictate the extent
to which an agency must document its rulemaking, and avoids scrutinizing
the methods used to reach its conclusions. As such, a remand for an inade-
quate record falls squarely within the provisions of the APA.76
Intervenors, courts, and administrative agencies will be significantly af-
fected by Vermont Yankee. In its wake, intervenors must seek alternative
methods for influencing agency decisionmaking. For example, they can
attempt to distinguish the holding in Vermont Yankee on the basis of con-
gressional intent. The Atomic Energy Act gives the Commission a clear
mandate to develop nuclear power.77 Courts reviewing actions governed
by statutes less precise might reason that Vermont Yankee applies only to
cases in which the intent of Congress is equally clear.
Additionally, intervenors can attempt to show "extraordinary circum-
stances" which may warrant procedural review by an appellate court. The
Court in Vermont Yankee suggested that procedural review might be sanc-
tioned where "[c]onstitutional constraints or extremely compelling circum-
stances require[d] judicial correction." 78 If agency rulemaking is shown to
have an exceptional effect upon a limited number of individuals, for exam-
ple, due process would require the use of procedures beyond those in sec-
tion 553.79 Likewise, the Court suggests that "a totally unjustified
departure from well settled agency procedures of long standing," such as
unexplained changes in hearing locations or arbitrary shortening of com-
75. But see Friendly, Some Kind oflearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1314 (1975).
Judge Friendly asserts that there is no real distinction between a remand for an inadequate
record and a remand for inadequate procedures.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976). Section 2011 states in pertinent part: "It is therefore de-
clared to be the policy of the United States that the development, use and control of atomic
energy shall be directed .... "
78. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
79. Id. at 542. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
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ment periods, might justify procedural review. 80
Given these limitations on judicial review, intervenors may still attempt
to influence agency decisionmaking within the constraints of section 553
itself. The required "basis and purpose" statement can be reviewed by
courts to assure that it contains reasons for adopting the rule as well as
reasons for rejecting written or oral testimony opposing the rule. 8' Fur-
thermore, if agency action is based upon important findings or assump-
tions, the findings must be made public to satisfy section 553 "notice"
requirements. Finally, although public interest groups may be unsuccess-
ful in challenging the substantive record, they may still influence agency
policy through lobbying rather than through the judicial review.
Reviewing courts must also heed Vermont Yankee's message. Courts
can no longer be sympathetic to intervenors' claims that they have not
been given the opportunity for a meaningful dialogue under section 553
procedures. Unless intervenors can demonstrate extraordinary circum-
stances, 82 courts must now limit their review to the extent to which an
agency's rule is suppported by an adequate substantive record.
Lastly, although Vermont Yankee will reduce an agency's burden of liti-
gating over procedural inadequacies, it is likely to increase its responsibil-
ity to bolster the substantive record in section 553 proceedings. Because
hybrid rulemaking on remand is no longer an option, courts can be ex-
pected to subject an agency's substantive record to much stricter scrutiny.
III. CONCLUSION
The Administrative Procedure Act and relevant agency enabling statutes
establish the minimum procedures for agency rulemaking. Vermont
Yankee clearly mandates that reviewing courts may not impose proce-
dures beyond those so specified, except in extraordinary circumstances.
The net effect of this decision is likely to be positive. 83 The past era has
seen an enormous flood of public interest litigation challenging adminis-
trative agency actions, fostered in part by the judicial activism of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Although there may be benefits
to judicial intervention in agency policymaking, the court's consideration
80. 435 U.S. at 542.
81. See Wright, supra note 1, at 396. Judge Wright maintains that review of an
agency's basis and purpose statements allows the courts to effectively attack agency abuses
of discretion. Id. at 396-97.
82. See text accompanying notes 79 & 80 supra.
83. But see K. DAVIs, supra note 1, at § 6:39. Professor Davis views the procedural
experimentation of the last decade by courts and the Congress favorably. He is concerned
that if Vermont Yankee is taken literally, the Supreme Court will "wipe out all the progress
that has been made." Id.
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of a multitude of procedural objections has delayed agency action inordi-
nately. By limiting judicial review to an examination of the substantive
record, Vermont Yankee should go far toward making agency rulemaking
a more rational and predictable process.
Grace Dawson Bateman
